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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AS CAUSATIVE AGENTS IN 
MOTOR VEHICLE INTERSECTION COLLISIONS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
An Overview
Ever since the automobile was invented, man has managed to find 
innumerable ways in which to kill or injure himself through the use of 
this great achievement in science and technology. As the number of vehi­
cles on the road has increased, so has the number of accidents, and, al­
though the death and injury rates have fluctuated somewhat, there is no 
question that the automobile has created a monumental environmental health 
problem. Tremendous efforts have been made to reduce the number of 
accidents, as well as their severity, but, as yet, these efforts have 
met with little success. Most of the emphasis in the past has been 
placed on the driver as the primary causative factor. Only recently 
researchers have begun to consider the multiple cause approach, and in 
particular the role of the environment as a primary contributing factor.
Death and injury statistics, such as those compiled by the National 
Safety Council (Table 1) (1), have been collected and presented to the 
public annually with relatively little effect on altering people's
TABLE 1
U.S. DEATHS AND INJURIES FROM 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS - 1971
Classification Total
Deaths 54,700
Bed disabling injuries 1,284,000
Non-bed disabling
With activity restriction 1,196,000
Without activity restriction 1,071,000
Permanent impairments 170,000
attitudes and reducing accidents. This contention has been supported by 
Whitlock (2) who observed that despite the enormity of these figures, 
road-death and injury rates have astonishingly little impact on the 
general population. For the most part, each new record has received 
only brief notice in the press, and the majority of readers, after ex­
pressing perfunctory concern, have remained indifferent or apathetic.
As the annual number of accidents has continued to mount, so have 
the costs. The National Safety Council (1) estimated that in 1971, motor 
vehicle accidents cost the United States approximately $15.8 billion of 
which $5 billion was in property damage and $10.8 billion was in injuries 
including wage loss as well as medical expenses.
Accidents which have resulted in death and injury have received
most of the publicity to date, however, the less severe and far more 
numerous property damage accidents have contributed heavily to this 
country's financial loss. Accidents involving property damage have in­
creased 35 per cent since 1966, and the average dollar amount has in­
creased from $489.82 in 1968 to $842.04 in 1971 (3).
Since the invention of the automobile, and the occurrence of the 
first motor vehicle accident, researchers have compiled and analyzed 
voluminous statistics pertaining to injuries and fatalities. Even with 
this mountain of available data, investigators have been unable to de­
velop effective solutions to the automobile accident dilemma. Americans 
have been talking about traffic safety since the turn of the century - 
yet there has been very little scientific proof about the causes and 
cures of accidents. Opinions and slogans have been relied on extensive­
ly, including attempts to frighten people into being more careful (4).
As late as 1965, less than $10 million a year was being spent on 
research aimed strictly at highway safety with some national direction 
(4). With the passage of the National Highway Safety Act in 1966, safety 
research increased considerably, but accomplishments in the area of acci­
dent prevention were still minimal. The seriousness of this state of 
ineffectiveness was further complicated by the considerable importance 
of road safety research to the economic welfare of any country. The 
philosophy of the Road Research Laboratory's investigators (5) was that 
if large sums of money were to be spent on the road and traffic system, 
that these funds should be spent as effectively as possible. Research 
on traffic safety should contribute substantially to this end.
The limited success of safety research in this country has been 
primarily a result of the philosophy toward automobile accidents. One 
probable reason for such a poor showing in the area of motor vehicle 
accident research is that the problem of traffic safety has not been 
dealt with effectively, because it has not been defined effectively; for 
over half a century, traffic safety has been seen primarily as a problem 
of individual behavior, when in fact, it should have been considered as 
a problem of public health (6),
As a public health problem, traffic safety can be treated in an 
epidemiological frame of reference. Accidents as a problem of health to 
populations conform to the same biologic laws as do disease processes 
and regularly evidence a comparable behavior (7). By implementing this 
epidemiologic approach, investigators could then define specific causes 
and search for individual solutions in an effort to decrease accident 
occurrence.
Before potential solutions can be investigated and recommended, 
it is first necessary to determine specific causes of the motor vehicle 
accidents. The term accident itself has been a very misleading one. In 
common usage, the word accident has been used to imply an event over 
which one has no control (8). Halsey (9) agreed that accidents were not 
accidents at all in the literal sense of the word; they do not simply 
"befall." A more definitive word representing the contact between two 
automobiles or an automobile and a fixed object would be collision. In 
an attempt to reduce automobile collisions, injuries and fatalities, 
agreement first has to be reached that collisions do not happen by chance 
or at random, but rather, they are caused by specific sets of circum-
stances, which in many cases are predictable and can be altered to re­
duce motor vehicle collisions.
As has been the general rule in the past, automobile collisions 
have been described as having one specific cause, and any further in-» 
vestigation has not been deemed necessary. The major source of motor 
vehic' ■ r llision information available to accident researchers has been 
the traxiic accident records compiled by the states and municipalities.
A major handicap in identifying accident-causing factors has been the 
inadequacy of this prime source of data: the accident records system (10).
In most cases, the official record of a traffic collision has 
consisted of a one or two page report form which was completed by the 
investigating officer, either at the scene of. the collision or shortly 
afterward. Traditionally, the principal objective of the police officer 
in accident investigation has been to find which operator was at fault 
(11). Assessment of fault has been of primary concern in settling 
insurance claims, and more in-depth investigation has not been deemed 
necessary. Responsibility for this deficiency in the investigative 
process should not have been placed on the police officer, but rather, 
on the entire system of data collection. The failure of some form of 
local, state or national data collection program has been one of the 
principal reasons for the inability of safety researchers to reduce 
automobile collisions and provide a safer system in which motor vehicles 
could be operated.
To further emphasize this problem of data collection, Taylor (12), 
in a sample of 14 police accident reports from different states, observed
that almost total emphasis for accident causation was placed on driver 
failure. The state of Oklahoma has been employing a system of cause 
assessment of a similar nature. Table 2 lists the choice of causes 
available to an accident investigation officer, as well as the number of 
collisions attributable to each cause for the year 1971. According to 
these statistics, 83 per cent of all traffic accidents were caused by 
human error, while 14 per cent of the collisions were listed as having 
other causes, and only 3 per cent were attributed to vehicle failure.
No other possible causes were even listed (3), Similar findings were 
reported in a study by the Stanford Research Institute, whose researchers 
reported in "U. S. News and World Report" (13) that 90.6 par cent of all 
automobile accidents were caused by improper driving, while another 7.4 
per cent were attributable to the drinking driver. Only 2 per cent of the 
accidents were reportedly caused by other factors, these being 1.7 per cent 
from faulty brakes and 0.3 per cent due to improper lights. No other 
causes were listed or discussed. The results of this study are presented 
in Table 3. Once again, these data were based on information obtained 
from police accident reports.
With this type of multiple choice accident cause selection, it is 
clear how the National Safety Council arrived at figures such as 90 per 
cent of all traffic collisions having been caused by a failure of the part 
of the drivers, or simply, human error. Taylor (12) has pointed out that 
this figure is not necessarily false, but rather, that the statement has 
no meaning. There have been too many accidents where driver errors and 
impairments could not be clearly separated from other equally important 
contributing factors.
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS BY CAUSE 
FOR OKLAHOMA - 1971
Official Cause No. of Collisions
Failed to yield 13,217
Following too closely 9,220
Unsafe speed 9,762
Improper turn 8,488
Improper lane change 2,421
Improper movement 5,376
Unsafe vehicle 2,025
Left of center 1,820
Other violations 2,645
Pedestrian actions 527
Other 9,447
Total 64,948
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS BY CAUSE*
Causative Factor Percentage of 
Collisions
Improper driving 90.6
Speeding, too fast for conditions 18.1
Failed to yield right of way 18.4
Ignored a stop sign 3.1
Disregarded a traffic signal 3.7
Drove in wrong lane, left of center 5.5
Overtook another car improperly 3.8
Made a turn improperly 4.7
Followed too closely 13.3
Other driver errors 20.0
Driver had been drinking 7.4
Faulty brakes h i
Improper lights 0.3
* These data were obtained from the National Safety Council,
The lack of the accident data gathering system in the United 
States caused Segal (11) to suggest four valuable objectives of scien­
tific collision investigation:
a) the improvement of mass data systems,
b) the development of quality control techniques on the mass data 
systems,
c) the establishment of causal hypotheses for verification by sta­
tistical and experimental techniques, and
d) the uncovering of faulty design and operating practices too 
subtle for detection by other methods.
Collision researchers have been unwilling to accept the single 
cause explanation for the hundreds of thousands of automobile collisions 
occurring in this country each year. This new philosophy toward accident 
causation has best been stated in The State of the Art of Traffic Safety 
(8) . The highway transportation system of the United States has con­
tinued to be one of the most complex systems in our society. Safety has 
been but one of its several requirements, the proper treatment of which 
has required an understanding of a wide variety of social, economic, po­
litical, psychological, legal and physiological, as well as engineering 
factors related to the highway, the vehicle and the driver. The system 
is characterized not only by its complexity, but also by the high degree 
of interconnectedness and interdependence of these many factors.
Smith (4) supported this hypothesis of a systems failure due to 
the inseparable interaction between the vehicle, roadway and the driver 
in every traffic situation. As a result of this relatively recent change 
to the concept of a systems approach to automobile accident investigation.
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the idea of a single cause has been replaced by one of numerous con­
tributory factors. A contributing element has come to mean any feature 
of the system, the variation of which will alter the risk of an 
accident (7).
An equally important concept is that a set of contributing 
factors or exceptional combination of circumstances has to be acting 
at any instant in order for a collision to occur (14)(15). This set of 
circumstances or contributing factors acts upon one or more of the three 
major variables of the transportation system with the occurrence of 
numerous accidents as the result. These three variables are the driver, 
the vehicle and the environment. Of these three, the driver has tra­
ditionally been credited as the source of almost all accidents. Only 
recently, safety researchers have begun to look beyond this superficial 
reasoning and initiated a procedure of investigating the entire system 
as it really exists, and the manner in which it functions in automobile 
accident causation.
Driving involves the performance of a complex perceptual-motor 
skill with the driver responding to and interacting with a large set of 
stimuli (8). However, in the commonly used simplistic approach to 
accident causation, the driver culpability theory was and still is often 
accepted. In other words, there has been a tendency to blame the driver 
for inefficiencies and breakdowns in the system, and especially for 
accident occurrence. A quite different point of view has come to be 
called the driver overload theory which is a multiple factor theory of 
accident causation (16).
Human error has been employed to cover up a multitude of causative
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factors. An accident may have, according to the official interpretation, 
been the result of a driver failing to yield at a stop sign; however, the 
driver's action may not have been a cause by itself, but rather, the 
result of some other set of circumstances. Therefore, these other vari­
ables have really caused the collision, not simply the driver's response 
to them, which was the only explanation appearing on the police report.
To more fully understand this hierarchy of causative factors, a 
common classification scheme, using three reasonably distinct phases of 
driver action, has been established. These phases included perception, 
judgement and action. Taking them separately, an accident may result 
where a driver fails to perceive, or incorrectly perceives, a situation. 
For example, accidents are more likely to occur where there are a number 
of things the driver has to see and pay attention to at the same time, 
such as at a busy intersection. The driver's view may be obstructed, 
making it impossible for him to see a potential hazard or at least to 
see it in its true perspective (15).
Utilizing the systems approach, accidents have been shown to be 
the result of a complicated series of events where the driver has 
consistently been labeled the sole causative agent. In fact, there may 
be a multiplicity of causes for every accident, revolving around the 
driver, the vehicle and the environment. Since these accidents are 
known to occur where the driver is presented with a large amount of data 
to evaluate, and where it is necessary for him to make many decisions 
at once, it is logical that one of the most likely locations for 
accidents to occur would be at intersections.
The Department of Transportation, through use of multidisciplinary
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accident investigation teams has stimulated much research into the 
underlying causes of motor vehicle accidents. They have organized their 
research around the three primary factors already mentioned; the driver, 
the vehicle and the environment. Investigation by these teams has shown 
that vehicle failure has not been a primary factor in more than a small 
percentage of collisions. While the driver still remains the dominant 
factor, in-depth investigation has indicated that environmental factors 
play a key role in accident causation. Instead of the 15 per cent of all 
accidents which have commonly been attributed to the highway, the portion 
of the total accident problem in which the highway bears some share of 
the responsibility may well be three times as great, and it may even be 
larger (17).
The continued occurrence of automobile collisions has indicated 
a failure by the road facility, vehicle and vehicle operator separately 
or jointly (18). The driver has been responsible for many collisions 
through his actions, but in most cases, it has been his driving 
environment which determined those actions and therefore deserves at 
least partial responsibility for causing the collision. In addition, it 
is a well known fact that environmental factors play an important role 
in increasing the severity of the collision or the injuries sustained 
by those involved.
Human Factors
Human variables have already been evaluated to some extent. 
Accidents have traditionally been blamed on the driver, and although he 
is in control of the car's movement, there are other considerations, 
some obvious, some subtle, to which the operator has to react in
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determining what driving maneuvers to execute. In fact, the driver's 
actions which bring about an accident may not be causes at all, but 
rather results, results of the driver's interpretation of environmental 
conditions which are the actual causes. This is not to be construed 
to mean that the motor vehicle operator is never at fault, but, in fact, 
that many times he is not the primary or sole cause.
Drinking drivers have; always been a problem, and many programs, 
such as the Alcohol Safety Action Program, have been instituted to limit 
this contributing source of over half of the automobile fatalities.
These programs have met with some success, and they have assisted in the 
reduction of the number of motor vehicle accidents. Other areas of action 
such as driver education, driver training, licensing and examination 
procedures have also helped, but not sufficiently to note any marked 
decline in the number of automobile collisions which occur each year.
Vehicle
The second area of concern has been the vehicle. Repeated 
studies (3)(13) have indicated that vehicle malfunction has been re­
sponsible for collisions only about 3 per cent of the time. The condition 
of the vehicles involved in accidents has overwhelmingly been judged by 
investigating officers to have been "apparently normal," although, the 
percentage of defective components hf ./een found to have increased 
with the age of the vehicle (3). Efforts have been made to reduce 
vehicle component failure by increasingly strict inspection and regis­
tration programs. Once again, this has failed to produce any significant 
reduction in the number of vehicle collisions.
Most of the research centered around the vehicle has involved
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safety equipment to lessen the severity of injuries received in collisions. 
Stress has been given to those aspects of the vehicle which, through 
modifications or additions, would reduce the effects of collision on a 
car's occupants. This has not been aimed at accident prevention, of 
course, although, it is a sensible approach to injury control (19). At 
the same time, automobiles have been designed with larger, more powerful 
engines which can attain higher speeds and increase the chance of injury, 
should a collision occur.
This type of approach has been consistent with the past philosophy 
concerning accidents. Much research has been devoted to limiting injury 
severity and providing better emergency treatment, but for the most part, 
accident prevention has received little attention. Vehicle and human 
factors researchers seem to have resigned themselves to the occurrence 
of large numbers of accidents and have been primarily concerned with 
limiting fatalities and severe injuries. This situation has brought 
about the necessity for a new philosophy, centered around accident pre­
vention, rather than around severity reduction.
Environment
The third area of consideration is the environment. Until 
recently, the environment, as a potential cause of motor vehicle acci­
dents, has been relatively neglected. This seems rather unusual, since 
the highway, after all, is the only variable in highway safety under full 
control of public officials (20).
Environmental conditions have been shown to be directly related 
to the manner in which the driver operates his vehicle. The immediate 
surrounding conditions of the road user often affect his behavior, and
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are therefore important when considering road safety and traffic flow (21).
Environmental factors have always been present and influence 
traffic conditions, as well as traffic accidents. These factors have 
contributed to highway safety in several important regards. Safe transpor­
tation has required, in addition to a properly functioning vehicle and 
operator, an accommodating roadway which permits the driver-vehicle 
combination to traverse it without incident. This has demanded that the 
environment provide not only a roadway surface compatible with the vehicle- 
driver combination, but also the information needed by the operator to 
maintain himself on his desired path. In this view, the environment has 
been understood to consist of: the physical elements of the roadway
itself and all other physical entities on the roadway which affect the 
safety of movement of the vehicle; the informational factors which provide 
the vehicle operator the information on his location on the road and the 
instructions for his continued travel; and a special set of informational 
factors concerned with traffic control (8).
Multidisciplinary Accident Investigation Research 
Due to the dissatisfaction with the simplistic approach to accident 
causation, the United States Department of Transportation instituted the 
Multidisciplinary Accident Investigation Program. This in-depth investi­
gation of collisions included a careful analysis of the basic elements 
of a collision:
a) human factors,
b) vehicle factors and-
c) environmental factors.
The three phases of the traffic system failure were also examined:
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a) pre-crash,
b) crash, and
c) post-crash (22).
Approximately, 16 of these teams were established in major cities 
and research centers across the country. Since their inception, they 
have provided the Department of Transportation with in-depth information 
on thousands of automobile collisions. These teams reported that vehicle 
failure was rarely the cause of accidents. Their findings pointed out 
that the human factor was still the predominant one, but that environ­
mental factors played a key role as contributory causes in a far greater 
proportion of these collisions than had been previously suspected.
In a study of 31 fatal automobile accidents, the Boston University 
team (23) included among its conclusions and observations that multiple- 
accident locations indicated road deficiencies which aggravated the human 
factors, and that trees and poles were often close to the pavement. In 
another study, the Indiana Unviersity team (24) found that in at least 
half of the 22 vehicular accidents attributed to driver error, environ­
mental factors contributed an added load to the system in which the driver 
erred. The Southwest Research Institute team (25) found that, in 53 
accidents, 65 road defects and hazardous conditions were observed which 
had directly caused, or significantly contributed to, producing the 
accident or injury.
The University of Miami team (26) observed that there were few 
safety engineering standards currently established and those few were 
thinly spread among other standards. Further, they recommended that a 
manual of minimum safety engineering standards be developed on a national
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level. A study conducted at the Georgia Institute of Technology (27) 
illustrated the need for remedial programs to improve the roadway 
environment due to the fact that environmental deficiencies were reported 
in 62 out of 100 cases investigated. In another study, a greater 
correlation was observed at the University of Miami (28) where it was 
found that in 29 of 40 cases, some form of traffic engineering hazard, 
as related to the accident, was noted. Boston University investigators 
(29), in a study of fatal collisions, concluded that there was a contribu­
tion to auto fatalities of poor highway illumination, curbing design, 
standard pole construction, lane demarcation and median barriers.
Further study of these and other factors leading to the refinement 
of our present laws and design standards may serve effectively to minimize 
highway fatalities. The U.C.L.A. team (30) concluded their report with 
the statement that, at the present time, the state of the art of environ­
mental analysis needs a great deal of specific information concerning 
individual cases.
All of these data were not employed to prove that environmental 
factors caused all motor vehicle accidents, but rather, to show that 
environmental factors play a significant role, both as a contributory 
cause and as a severity increasing factor.
At the time of this writing, most accident research and the resulting 
safety standards have been directed toward selected vehicular factors.
As pointed out earlier, this philosophy concedes the occurrence of the 
accident and has as its thrust, injury control through improving the 
crash worthiness of the vehicle. The environmental factors which may 
have contributed to accident causation have been virtually ignored.
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Due to the lead time required by manufacturers to effect design 
changes, the life span of the vehicle after manufacture, and the re­
luctance of regulatory authorities to require post-production addition 
of safety equipment, improving highway safety through vehicular modifi­
cation is, at best, slow. On the other hand, minimization of the environ­
mental factors in accidents has as its philosophy the prevention of the 
accident. Logically, contributory environmental factors can be 
identified and eliminated in a much shorter time frame.
Clearly, more in-depth research is necessary to isolate these 
specific hazards and remedy them in an effort to decrease the public 
health problem identified as motor vehicle accidents.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Transportation System 
At locations where the roadways are wide and straight and where 
traffic volume has been low, accidents have been rare. Unfortunately, 
urban areas, by nature, have not met these criteria. The urban transpor­
tation problem has become more complicated, with increased congestion, 
and, as would have been anticipated, an increased number of motor vehicle 
collisions. The difficulty of the driving task has continually increased, 
as is evidenced by unusually high urban accident rates. These increased 
rates have paralleled an increase in the severity of environmental con­
ditions. As greater demands have been placed on driver ability, human 
error has increased disproportionately (31). One of the essential causa­
tive factors, at least in urban accidents, has been the failure of the 
transportation system itself. Drivers, subjected to constant stress and 
conflict, with complicated decisions and maneuvers to make, have misjudged 
or misinterpreted environmental conditions or hazards with the inevitable 
result of an avalanche of motor vehicle accidents, injuries and fatalities.
Within any urban area, driving conditions vary from one location 
to another, but accident rates have always been consistently high at 
intersections. Table 4 illustrates the increase in the number of inter-
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS BY 
INTERSECTION/NON-INTERSECTION*
Year All Accidents
Intersection Non-intersection
Number Percentage Number Percentage
1968 24,682 41.6 34,602 58.4
1969 22,513 35.3 41,308 64.7
1970 • 27,820 41.9 38,637 58.1
1971 32,528 50.1 32,400 49.9
* Data obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 
section collisions in Oklahoma City from 1968 to 1971 at which time they 
finally surpassed non-intersection collisions (3).
Intersections have been defined as the area shared by two or more 
roads. The primary operational function of the intersection is to permit 
a change in travel route. Because of this, the intersection becomes a 
point of decision. The motorist has to decide on one of the available 
alternative choices. Thus, an intersection presents the driver with 
added tasks not required at non-intersection points on the road (18).
All intersections have not been equally dangerous with equally 
high accident rates. The number and type of accidents at these locations 
have been strongly influenced by the type of intersection, the individual 
details of design, the volume of traffic and the control devices used (15). 
For example, Taylor (32), in the early 1930's found that three-way inter­
sections consistently had lower accident rates than four-way intersections.
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Staffeld (33), In a study conducted in the early 1950's observed similar 
results. This was reasonable since intersections represent pairs of 
discontinuities which present additional hazards to highway travel (8).
The more complicated the intersection, the more hazardous and the higher 
the number of automobile collisions. Therefore, if intersections were 
simplified, the conflicts reduced and the hazards removed, the number 
of accidents could be reduced considerably.
Two alternative approaches to solving the problem of urban 
transportation have been put forth as a result of the annually increasing 
traffic volume and the already over crowded city streets. The first 
approach, which actually contains many different possibilities, has come 
to be known as mass transportation or mass transit. High-speed mass 
transit systems, spch as commuter railroads, subways, or even monorails, 
could be built relatively easily and inexpensively to relieve the con­
gestion and keep the cities from choking (34).
Most cities have been reluctant to invest in such a major departure 
from the American philosophy of each individual driving his own automobile, 
so the second alternative, that of modifying and improving our present 
transportation network, has gained more popular acceptance. For an urban 
road network of a given capacity, which has been subjected to a certain 
demand level, it is theoretically possible to exert direct control over 
these complex flow patterns in such a manner as to optimize some index 
of performance. The capacity of the network could be regulated or 
increased by:
a) modification of existing roads,
b) construction of new roads.
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c) use of smaller or more efficient transport units and
d) the direct control of traffic movement (35).
Many traffic researchers have focused their attention on various 
design aspects of the urban transportation system with particular 
emphasis on intersection operations. By making traffic movements more 
fluid and by creating fewer conflicts and reducing confusion at these 
intersections through the use of improved signs and signal devices, it 
was thought that intersection traffic accidents could be reduced by a 
significant amount.
Day and Time Relationships 
Two of the first environmental factors which received study were 
day and time relationships. Collisions did not occur randomly throughout 
the week, but rather, they peaked during the Friday-Saturday time period. 
As may be seen in Table 5, an average of about 13.1 per cent of the
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACCIDENTS BY DAY OF WEEK*
Year Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. . Fri. Sat. Sun.
1968 13.5 13.4 13.5 13.2 16.8 18.0 11.7
1969 13.5 12.5 14.2 13.4 17.4 17.1 11.9
1970 14.0 13.2 13.2 14.3 17.1 17.1 11.1
1971 13.6 13.4 14.3 13.9 17.3 16.7 10.8
Annual
Average 13.6 13.1 13.8 13.7 17.2 17.2 11.4
* Data obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety.
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accidents have occurred on each of the days Sunday through Thursday, 
while the rate rose to 17.2 per cent for Friday, and the same for 
Saturday. Table 6 shows an even more pronounced increase in the per-
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC FATALITIES BY DAY OF WEEK*
Year Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun.
1968 10.8 9.8 10.5 12.8 12.5 22.5 21.1
1969 10.8 9.5 12.2 12.8 16.4 19.8 18.5
1970 9.2 9.6 12.4 14.8 15.8 20.6 17.6
1971 10.3 10.0 9.3 15.2 17.2 21.3 16.7
Annual
Average 10.3 9.7 11.1 13.9 15.5 21.0 18.5
* Data obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 
centage of fatalities during this 48-hour time period, which carried over 
to Sunday, mainly due to early morning collisions. Figures 1 and 2 on 
the following page illustrate these findings.
Table 7 illustrates the frequency of occurrence of accidents under 
different lighting conditions. These data appear to show that the oc­
currence of accidents in the dawn/dusk period has been in proportion to 
the amount of time while those lighting conditions existed. The difference 
between the daylight and darkness figures is believed to be due to the 
small number of vehicles on the road after dark. A more detailed study 
of similar data for 1972 (36) (Table 8), showed approximately the same 
findings. It is a recognized fact that there is a higher accident rate
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Figure 1. Percentage of accidents by day of week.
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Figure 2. Percentage of fatalities by day of week.
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TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC COLLISIONS BY LIGHT CONDITIONS*
Year Daylight Darkness Dawn/Dusk, Etc.
1968 69.5 22.1 8.4
1969 69.8 22.3 7.9
1970 71.2 20.8 8.0
1971 71.5 20.8 7.7
Annual
Average 70.5 21.5 8.0
* Data obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety.
TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS BY LIGHT CONDITIONS - 1972
Light All Fatal Non-fatal
Condition Accidents Accidents Injury Acc.
Daylight 12,388 35 2,079
Dawn or dusk. . 543 5 113
Darkness 3,583 41 928
Not stated 61 0 45
Totals 16,575 81 3,165
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after dark, based on actual vehicle miles traveled by the smaller number 
of motor vehicles operating during this time period. No data were availa­
ble on the number of vehicle miles driven in Oklahoma City after dark; 
therefore, this relationship could not be studied more precisely. The 
lighting condition is just one environmental factor that has affected 
accident occurrence.
As shown in Table 9, accidents have also occurred with different
TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE OF OKLAHOMA TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS BY TIME OF DAY*
Year 12:00 
3 AM
3:01 
6 AM
6:01 
9 AM
9:01
Noon
12:01 
3 PM
3:01 
6 PM
6:01 
9 PM
9:01
Mid.
1968 6.3 2.6 10.7 13.3 16.9 25.4 14.8 10.0
1969 5.7 2.4 10.6 12.8 17.3 26.3 15.2 9.7
1970 5.4 2.3 10.4 13.4 18.0 26.6 14.5 9.4
1971 5.0 2.2 10.5 13.6 18.2 26.4 14.6 9.5
Annual
Average 5.6 2.4 10.5 13.3 17.6 26.2 14.7 9.7
* Data obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 
frequencies at different times of the day. There has been a general 
trend of increasing accident rates from before dawn through the evening 
rush hour, and then a gradual decline from then to the early morning 
hours. Figure 3 shows a detailed summary of accident occurrence by time 
of day and day of week combined, for the year 1972. The peaks are in 
line with data already discussed.
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All of the afore mentioned data clearly Indicate that accidents 
have occurred most frequently when the number of vehicles on the roads 
was large. Traffic volume, especially with regard to intersection col­
lisions was also an important determining factor.
Traffic Volume
When there were few vehicles on the roads, collisions were much 
less fréquent. As city streets have become more crowded, particularly 
at intersections, the number of collisions has increased rapidly. This 
relationship between increasing volume and increasing collisions has 
not been linear.
Although it is known that collisions are related to traffic volume, 
Vey (37), in the 1930's, discovered that the number of accidents per 
million vehicle miles increased with volume up to about 7,000 vehicles 
per day, then decreased with further increases in volume. The results 
of this study were later substantiated by Raff (38), who found a similar 
relationship with a break in the curve at slightly under 9,000 vehicles 
per day. At traffic volumes greater than these values, it was found that 
congestion reached a point where vehicle movement was slowed considerably 
and the number of accidents declined.
Researchers found that this relationship is further complicated 
by intersection and road design. Millard (39) observed that congestion 
was rarely due to a lack of road capacity, particularly at junctions 
where conflicting traffic movements produced approximately 70 per cent 
of London's traffic accidents. In a related study, Jorgensen (40) noted 
that Connecticut highways which met modern design standards had lower 
accident rates than those of all highways in the same traffic volume
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groups. If intersections were designed safely to limit conflicting 
movements, large traffic volumes could be handled with relatively few 
collisions.
Pavel (41) suggested that, in order to obtain a realistic picture 
of traffic conditions at any particular time, several flow parameters 
were relevant. These were:
a) number of vehicles per unit time,
b) vehicle density on the street section supervised,
c) average vehicle speed,
d) vehicle categories,
e) vehicle presence and
f) the degree of occupancy of a street.
The central problem confronting urban transportation planners 
has been of moving large volumes of traffic through a system of streets 
and intersections. Too often, these streets and intersections have been 
and continue to be antiquated and in need of major repairs and reno­
vations. Many methods have been developed to control and guide the 
masses of vehicles through these street systems, while reducing the number 
of collisions at the same time.
One-Way Streets
One-way streets have a number of characteristics which would 
enhance highway safety. First, there are fewer points of potential 
conflict at intersections. Second, with no opposing traffic, the chances 
of head-on and sideswipe accidents are virtually eliminated. Third, 
turning vehicles can be passed, thereby reducing the possibility of rear- 
end collisions. Fourth, and perhaps most important, signals can be timed
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for progressive movement, reducing the number of stops and keeping the 
vehicles in orderly groups, with well defined intervals between groups 
for pedestrian and vehicle crossings (15).
One-way streets have been used with a great deal of success in 
Oklahoma City. By designating alternating downtown streets as one-way, 
either north or south, not only have there been fewer accidents, but traffic 
flow has improved greatly, allowing much faster access to, and egress from, 
the downtown area.
Other major cities have employed one-way streets extensively, 
particularly where old and narrow streets were not able to accommodate 
large volumes of two-way traffic. However, one-way streets were not 
always possible, so other methods, had to be devised to control conflicting 
traffic on two-way streets. In most cases, these have not been extremely 
successful in limiting automobile collisions, as evidenced by the large 
number of high density accident intersections.
Speed Limits
Speed was once thought to be a prime factor in accident causation, 
and has been clearly demonstrated to be a definite injury severity in­
creasing factor. In every case for which information was available, the 
imposition of a speed limit in an urban area was followed by a reduction 
in serious injuries in other areas (5); however, its relation to accident 
causation was far more complicated. Speed limits have been imposed on 
most roadways as a safety feature, but this action itself has contributed 
to the cause of many collisions, as a result of a lack of forethought on 
the part of those who determined the speed limits.
The problem which arose from establishing speed limits was that
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their values were of an arbitrary nature, often providing drivers with 
a false sense of security and safety, simply because they were driving 
below the speed limit. It was found that, all too frequently, drivers 
thought that, just because they were driving at a slow rate of speed in 
vehicles they presumed to be in good condition, they were safe. Actually, 
these people produced more accidents than the faster drivers.
For speed limits to be effective at both providing an even traffic 
flow and preventing accidents, it is necessary that they be set according 
to environmental circumstances. Any speed limit is reasonable only for 
the roadway and traffic conditions for which it is set. Since this has 
been generally for fair weather and off-peak volumes, it has been un­
reasonably high for extreme weather and traffic conditions, and low for 
more favorable conditions. Speed limits based on studies of the prevailing 
speeds, the character of the road, the extent and character of development 
along the margins of the roadway and the accident history of the roadway 
have tended to reduce the spread in speeds, from the highest to the lowest, 
and thereby have resulted in a smoother traffic flow. This smoother flow 
has resulted in a reduction of accidents (15).
The traffic engineering handbook recommended four basic factors 
to be considered in establishing speed limits: prevailing vehicle speed,
physical features of the road, accident experience and traffic character­
istics and control (42). Variable speed limit signs have been in use for 
some time; however, their use has been largely limited to turnpikes and 
school zones. Utilizing signs of this type on other urban streets would 
most likely have a beneficial effect on traffic flow as well as accident 
reduction.
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Auxiliary Lanes
In addition to regulation of speed, the creation of auxiliary 
lanes has aided greatly in establishing a smoother traffic flow through 
intersections. One of the fundamental causes of traffic difficulties 
has been the difference between the speeds of vehicles operating in the 
same lane. Since at most intersections it is necessary for the drivers 
to slow down to turn off the roadway, and equally necessary to make the 
turn at a slow speed, special provisions have to be made for these 
functions (9).
Normally, the first concern of engineers in providing lane channel­
ization has been to aid those drivers in making a left or right-hand turn. 
The advantages of such a system also include better flow for through 
traffic and protection from drivers who have to deviate from the average 
traffic speed to turn onto or off of a roadway (42). Rear-end collisions 
have traditionally been the most numerous at intersections, particularly 
with regard to the through traffic. The number of this and all other 
types of collisions have been reduced by redesigning intersections to 
include some form of auxiliary lane configuration.
A study conducted by Thomas (43) in Denver involved a section of 
Federal Boulevard which contained 48 intersections, 12 of which were 
traffic signal-controlled. Accident records were compared for the years 
1961 and 1963, those immediately preceding and following the channelization 
project. As left-turning motorists were removed from the through lanes, 
the through traffic was able to move smoothly along the street, as evi­
denced by the 52 per cent decrease in rear-end accidents at previously 
non-channelized intersections. There was also a savings of $151,200 in
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accident costs for the year 1963.
In a similar study in Arizona, Crossette and Allen (44) showed the 
value of painted channelization and signal synchronization. Painted 
channelization was installed throughout the study section of roadway to 
provide a 16-foot painted median and four 12-foot travel lanes. As a 
result, traffic volume in this 14-block distance was increased 19 per cent 
from 17,800 to 21,100 vehicles per day. Total accidents were reduced 41 
per cent from 100 to 59 the next year and injury accidents were decreased 
a total of 58 per cent.
Left turn lanes have been designed in several different ways.
Medians have been used to separate left turn lanes from oncoming traffic, 
as have curbings and other channeling devices. The most common type has 
been simply an extra lane with pavement markings indicating left turn 
only. At more complicated or highly traveled intersections, lane channel­
ization has not been the entire solution to left turn and rear-end accidents, 
As left turn accidents and the problems of left turn flow increased, the 
second stage of left turn protection usually involved the installation of 
left turn signal phasing (45). A study in Los Angeles County examined 
comparative accident experience of intersections with special left turn 
lanes in the median but no special signal phase, and intersections with 
both features. The results indicated that the turning accident rate at 
those without the special signal phase was three times as great as the 
rate at intersections having both (46).
Provision of a special left turn phase in the traffic signal 
sequence has brought about a longer delay at the intersection for through 
traffic. Surveys have indicated that most drivers were willing to accept
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an additional 3-to 5-second delay at an intersection for the safety and 
convenience of a left turn phase (45).
Right turn channelization has also been employed to a lesser extent, 
particularly at intersections with a high traffic flow and pedestrian 
movement. These right turn lanes have often been employed in conjunction 
with signs allowing motorists to make a right turn on a red light, further 
improving intersectional traffic flow. Accidents under these conditions 
were far fewer than would be expected based on right turn traffic volume.
These special turning lanes have been found to reduce delays, rear- 
end collisions, and turning accidents, and they have added to roadway 
capacity at intersections. The separation of left turning traffic into 
a distinct lane, clearly indicating the intent of those vehicles, has 
eased the danger of the crossing and diverging conflicts (18).
Roadway Markings
Roadway markings have been employed primarily for one specific 
purpose, to provide channels within which a motor vehicle could operate 
without coming in contact with another motor vehicle. .Many colors have 
been used to signify different conditions to motorists. Conner (47) found 
that from both motorist surveys and scientific experiments, color was the 
one factor that motorists first noticed and recognized in road markings.
As a result, entire lanes have been painted at some locations to indicate 
exit ramps or slow dangerous areas. The use of colored pavement has been 
somewhat experimental. The most common uses of pavement markings has been 
as center lines and lane dividers, and less frequently, as road edge 
markings.
Lane markings have been very effective in reducing accidents of
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all types. Although few studies have been done in this area, Prisk (48) 
reported that placing lane lines on the roadways of the Pentagon network 
resulted in a 33 per cent reduction of accidents.
The effectiveness of pavement markings is directly related to their 
visibility. In daylight, under normal conditions, the lines are usually 
quite visible, but after dark, or when the pavement is wet, they often 
become invisible. As a result, many types of paints and plastics of a 
reflective nature have been studied.
To reduce the risk of accidents, traffic engineers in Cleveland 
installed thermoplastic lane marking stripes containing reflective glass 
beads. The expected life of the thermoplastic was between 3 and 6 years, 
depending on street traffic volume and pavement type. One year after 
installation on a length of heavily traveled roadway, the thermoplastic 
markings were clearly visible, while on a similar length of roadway, the 
paint had almost entirely worn off. The perma lines were considerably 
more expensive, but it was estimated that if they lasted four years, they 
would be economically competitive with paint (49).
Wet pavement has always made it difficult to see markings on the 
roadway. The heavier the rain, the more obscured these markings have 
become. After much experimentation, the State of Florida Road Department 
(50) has applied waterproof glass beads to mark 15,000 miles of center 
lines and 8,000 miles of edge lines. The difference between these beads 
and the older type became more and more outstanding as the water on the 
pavement was increased. When the pavement was flooded, the waterproof 
bead line remained visible, while the standard line was ineffective as 
a marking.
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In England (51), 80 to 90 per cent of their road lines have been 
marked with a similar thermoplastic material, which has superior visibility 
characteristics. In West Germany, where a reflectorized. plastic material 
was applied cold, it was found that this material not only lasted as long 
as the thermoplastic, but it was not as sensitive to temperature changes 
(52). Unlike England and West Germany, engineers in the Netherlands (53) 
found paint, including reflectorized glass beads, to be adequate for their 
roadway conditions; however, they also advocated the use of thermoplastic 
strips.
In several studies, including one by Basile (54) of the Kansas 
Highway Commission, road edge markings, which were not used as extensively 
as lane markings, have been shown to be an equally valuable safety feature, 
and have proven quite effective in preventing motor vehicle collisions.
The Kansas study included some 20 sections of Kansas highway, totaling 
approximately 200 miles, and showed a 21 per cent reduction in total 
accidents, a 26 per cent reduction in personal injury and a 59 per cent 
reduction in fatalities, attributable to pavement edge markings of two- 
lane highways of 20-foot width or more.
Other types of pavement markings, including arrows and printed 
instructions, have also been used. When these markings were of a high 
visibility material, they were effective in reducing motor vehicle 
collisions.
Signs and Signals
Signs and signals have been among the most important segments of 
the intersection, and have been commonly grouped together as traffic control 
devices. They have traditionally served in three basic capacities: as
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warning devices, regulatory devices and information guides. Their ob­
jectives are to promote an orderly traffic flow, reduce accidents, permit 
the safe movement of cross traffic and cost less than grade separation.
They should never invite accidents (55).
As the transportation system has become more crowded and complex, 
the number of road signs has increased drastically. The objectives of 
these signs are to promote traffic flow and enhance safety. In many cases, 
the opposite has been true, and improperly placed or worded signs have 
confused drivers and contributed to the causation of a large number of 
traffic accidents. When road signs are unintelligible, the driver 
hesitates - and a hesitating driver is a hazard (56). Hulbert (57) noted 
that humans could learn to negotiate even complex systems, providing 
certain basic principles were used to provide them guidance information. 
These included: interpretation, continuity, advance notice, relatability,
prominence and unusual maneuvers. Most of the signs that have been em­
ployed not only have fallen short of these criteria, but have incorporated 
negative characteristics into their design and placement.
As recently as 1969, less than 50 per cent of the signs on our 
nation's roadways complied with nationally adopted standards. On roads 
built without federal aid, less than 20 per cent of the signs met national 
standards (58). In a state-wide survey, the Tennessee Department of 
Highways (59) inventoried some 400,000 official signs. Of these, only 
44,000, or 10 per cent, were judged to be even adequate in wording or 
location. Of the remaining 90 per cent, some were labeled as unnecessary, 
some were removed altogether, some were replaced and over half of them 
were replaced and repositioned.
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Another study in Costa Mesa, California, involved a program of night 
inspection of the roadways for environmental hazards. It was reasoned 
that traffic signs which were readily visible during the day might not be 
so after dark. In the first year, this program uncovered 300 dangerous 
conditions. These included such hazards as signs obscured by overgrown 
and poorly placed shrubbery, reflectorized sign surfaces that no longer 
reflected the message adequately, sign posts and signs allowed to remain 
in damaged condition (60).
The problems with many existing signs include print too small to 
read at great distances or at high speed, too many words on one sign to 
be read at high speed, signs not lighted or reflectorized, signs too dirty 
to read, signs badly damaged or completely missing, some obscured by over­
grown trees and other obstructions and many not clearly visible due to 
conflicting commercial signs and lighting.
Over the past few years, the United States has converted many of 
its road signs to the international system which employs a system of 
pictures which are, therefore, easier for motorists to perceive and involve 
no reading. These new signs have been used primarily on major highways, 
and most intersections have retained a cluster of unnecessary and confusing 
signs.
Safety engineers have found that people react differently to what 
they see at various speeds and under various conditions (61). Signs had 
to be designed for the particular environmental situation into which they 
were to be placed. Equally important as the type of sign is the placement 
of it, so as to be in the most readable position for the driver. The 
mounting position is dependent to an extent on the type of lighting
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available. Straub and Allen, as cited by Forbes (16), found that a 
mounting position 5 feet to the right and 8 feet above the pavement was the 
most effective, and that overhead mounting was the least effective.
Traffic engineers have even gone to such extremes as using candy- 
cane striped poles for stop signs in an effort to make them more visible 
to drivers. In one study, a "before and after" survey showed a marked 
decline in the number of drivers failing to stop at stop signs with these 
special poles. It was also reported that accidents at these intersections 
had declined (62).
Traffic signals have been used for many years as the primary means 
of controlling intersection traffic. For the most part, these signals 
have been installed when an intersection became congested due to a heavy 
traffic flow. Little thought was given to many other variables which 
affected the placement and function of traffic control signals.
Traffic signal systems have raised the traffic output of inter­
sections, enhanced safety and facilitated an orderly traffic flow by 
establishing distinct time relationships and displaying clearly discernable 
signals (41). Properly installed traffic control signals involve four 
areas of operation:
a) provision for orderly movement of traffic and increase in the 
traffic-handling capacity of most intersections,
b) reduction of certain types of accidents - most notably the 
right angle collision,
c) provision for a substantial flow of vehicular traffic at a 
reasonable speed along a roadway when coordinated with each 
other and
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d) provision for safe crossing of heavy traffic (18).
Few traffic signals have met these criteria. Much research has been 
devoted to developing appropriate signals and solving intersectional 
traffic flow problems.
The selection of the proper signal, its placement and phasing have 
had to be determined either on an intersection by intersection basis or 
on an intersection system basis. Too frequently, signals to control 
vehicular movements have been placed randomly with less than satisfactory 
results. In fact, little study has been undertaken to determine whether 
a traffic signal is even the best form of control for a particular inter­
section.
Intersection accidents have been classified into distinct categories, 
each having a common set of causative factors. Improvements in design or 
control have usually been directed toward a particular type of accident.
A multiple approach is necessary to reduce all types of collisions. It 
is first important to know how many and what type of collisions have 
occurred. As may be seen in Table 10, which shows types of intersection 
accidents by frequency of occurrence, over half of the intersection acci­
dents in Oklahoma City in 1970 have been angle collisions. Nearly 20 per 
cent were rear-end collisions involving two vehicles traveling in the 
same direction and over 10 per cent resulted when one vehicle was turning 
left and one going straight in the opposing direction (63).
In many studies, the key to traffic control at a particular inter­
section has been found to be the volume of traffic handled by the inter­
section. Vey's (64) studies showed that traffic control signals by no 
méans resulted in fewer total accidents, although they did reduce certain
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TABLE 10
TWO-VEHICLE INTERSECTION ACCIDENTS - OKLAHOMA 1970
Type All 
Acc.
Fatal
Acc.
Non-Fatal 
Injury Acc.
Property Dam. 
Accidents
1. Entering at angle 3809 23 897 2889
2. From same direction
a. Both straight 443 0 35 408
b. 1 straight-1 turn 508 0 41 467
c. 1 stopped 1363 0 196 1167
d. All others 44 0 5 39
3. From opposite dir.
a. Both straight 101 1 29 71
b. 1 straight-1 turn 926 0 202 724
c. All others 54 0 3 51
4. Not stated 0 0 0 0
Totals 7248 24 1408 5816
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kinds of accidents. Generally, after signalization, right angle col­
lisions and others involving vehicles on crossing approaches showed a 
drop, while rear-end and turning collisions between vehicles on the same 
street increased. Other studies have shown that many of these rear-end 
and turning collisions could be avoided by the installation of channel­
ization and special turning intervals.
A study by Solomon (65) in Michigan, involving 39 intersections, 
showed that after signalization, total accidents actually increased. He 
noted however, that accidents decreased at complex intersections and at 
intersections with high traffic volumes. He also observed that there 
were fewer people killed or injured at these intersections.
Syrek (66) conducted a study comparing the effectiveness of four­
way stop signs with traffic signals at high and low volume intersections. 
He found that four-way stop signs showed a lower accident rate when the 
traffic volume for the minor street was 7,000 vehicles per day and for 
the major street was 8,000 vehicles per day. At high volume intersections 
where the minor street volume remained the same, but the major street 
volume increased to 15,000 vehicles per day, the traffic signals proved 
to be considerably safer than four-way stopsi The results of this study 
are presented in Table 11.
Since the invention of the traffic signal, there have been many 
adaptations and revisions in this traffic control device. There have been 
many features, besides the sequencing itself, that have led to smoother 
traffic flow and fewer accidents. The simple prohibition of left turns 
at an intersection all but eliminated left turn accidents, and drastically 
reduced rear-end collisions. Ray (67) found that the employment of right-
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TABLE 11
ACCIDENT RATES PER MILLION VEHICLE MILES FOR 
HIGH AND LOW VOLUME INTERSECTIONS
Low Volume
§, P.P.Q minoz. 
4-Way Stop Signal
High Volume 
15,000 major-TJiOOO minor 
4-Way Stop Signal
Right angle .35 .30 .44 .30
Rear-end .14 .19 .34 .19
Left turn .P7 .17 .07 .17
Totals .56 .66 .85 .66
turn-on-red signs, in conjunction with traffic signals, reduced right 
turn accidents in comparison to right turn traffic volume.
Adjustments to the signals themselves have produced favorable 
results. By employing more signal faces at the intersection, and by 
increasing the size of each light, visual perception was improved. Larger 
flashing signals, measuring 1 foot in diameter, have been installed at 
crosswalks in Los Angeles. These flashers have also been provided with 
2-foot wide back plates allowing the flashing light to become more 
visible (68).
Even the position of the signal has been important in reducing 
intersection collisions. The modernization of 25 Detroit intersections 
with mast-arm suspended signals and new pedestrian signal indications 
resulted in a 78 per cent reduction in angle collisions and a 33 per cent 
reduction in pedestrian accidents (69).
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In the past, many angle collisions in particular have revolved 
around the length of the amber or yellow phase of the signal cycle.
There are regions approaching the intersection from which the motorist 
has to either brake sharply, or enter the intersection at the risk of a 
collision with cross traffic (8). This has resulted primarily from the 
traffic engineer's rule of thumb for setting the amber phase to allow 1 
second for every 10 miles of approach speed. Generally this has taken 
into consideration only stopping distance, not the width of the inter­
section nor the length of a vehicle and its acceleration and stopping 
characteristics coupled with driver reaction time (70). In short, many 
signals do not allow a sufficiently long amber phase for all traffic to 
come to a safe stop. The use of an all-red period of a few seconds has 
also been successful in reducing angle collisions. A study of 12 inter­
sections over a 24-month period showed a 41 per cent reduction in injury 
accidents as a result of the installation of the all-red phase (8),.
At complicated intersections, the installation of signals without 
conflicting indications has become increasingly difficult. Drivers ap­
proaching such intersections have become confused and slowed down, im­
mediately creating a traffic hazard (71). A solution to this problem has 
been found, but has not yet been used extensively in many cities. A 
method has been developed to channel the signal's light to a specific 
roadway area, thereby reducing driver confusion. This optical device 
has been developed to allow clear visibility for all relevant lanes - even 
around curves - but appears dark to motorists in lanes not governed by 
this signal (72).
The promotion of smooth traffic flow and reduced accidents has
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often required more than a single signal at one intersection. It has 
become necessary to tie together series of intersections with coordinated 
signal phases, allowing a group of vehicles traveling near the speed 
limit to reach all of the lights while green, and thus provide a smoother 
traffic flow. Allsop (73) found that when neighboring intersections in 
a network of roads were controlled by traffic signals, delay to traffic 
in the network could be reduced by linking the signals so that as many 
as possible of the vehicles released by one signal reached the next during 
the green period. Furthermore, some of these systems have been tied into 
computer networks allowing the changing of the signal phases depending 
on traffic conditions. Some of these systems have even made use of 
closed circuit television to check traffic conditions from minute to 
minute and adjust the signal phases appropriately.
Los Angeles traffic safety engineers recently placed in operation 
the fourth in a series of interconnected traffic signal systems. This 
marked an important step forward in a vast master control supervision 
system that would, by 1974, tie together all principal signalized inter­
sections within the city (74), San Jose, California researchers have 
also tested the effects of a digital control system, and evaluation 
studies have indicated that measurable improvements in the traffic flow 
through the system have resulted (75).
Charleston's traffic controllers have instituted a similar program 
of moment to moment signal variation, and also included a data bank to 
compile information on traffic patterns for use in long range planning. 
Their initial system included control over 90 intersections, and expected 
results included an estimated 25 to 35 per cent rise in rush hour traffic
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flow and increased car speeds of 10 to 20 miles per hour (76). New York 
traffic experts have also begun using a similar system dividing the city 
into 19 major traffic control areas, which receive their information from 
a number of control sensors placed throughout the system (77).
The proper use of traffic control signs and signals has been a 
very complicated one. Every intersection has had to be treated separately, 
depending on its particular environmental conditions; yet such inter­
sections have had to be coordinated in series in order to provide the most 
efficient traffic flow and safety. Most cities have not modernized their 
traffic control system to cope with the increasing traffic volumes and 
accident rates.
Roadside Billboards
Even at many appropriately signalized intersections, accident rates 
have remained high due to the confusion created by the competition for 
the driver's attention. In commercial areas, where advertising signs and 
store window displays have been designed to attract the eye, this problem 
has become most acute. This has been particularly true on wide streets 
(two or more lane approach) where a signal post-mounted on the corner 
might be out of the driver's cone of sharp vision. If the signal had been 
made more competitive visually, accidents might have been reduced. Based 
on an accident history of 68 Los Angeles intersections at which signal 
visibility was improved, it was concluded that this type of improvement 
had a significant effect in reducing the most prominent types of accidents 
at urban signalized intersections and would, therefore, have a high 
payoff in relation to the relatively low cost of the improvements (78) .
A Vermont study showed that policies on off-premises outdoor advertising
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in its present form was distractive to the motorist (79).
The visual clutter provided by these roadside signs and other 
extraneous lighting undoubtedly interferes with the driver's view of 
traffic signals, as well as his perception of the roadway itself.
Visibility and Illumination 
In order for a driver to maneuver his vehicle safely from one 
point to another, it is necessary for him to have a favorable environment 
which would allow him to operate his vehicle safely within the limits of 
his vehicle's turning and handling capabilities and his own motor response 
characteristics. For him to negotiate this roadway, it is necessary for 
him to be able to see the features of the roadway, as well as the roadside 
characteristics. When considering visibility, the separate factors of 
physical obstruction of view, inadequate illumination and interference all 
are part of this category (8).
Intersections have proven to be very complex problems in this 
respect. They require adequate visibility on all roadways, ramps and 
areas of speed change (80). Visibility obstructions include such common 
roadway features as guardrails, walls and fences, trees and shrubs and 
parked and moving vehicles. Many of these visibility obstructions have 
also been significant in increasing the severity of collisions. These 
include such roadside hazards as bridge abutments and piers and lighting 
and utility poles, in addition to those already mentioned.
Many roadside signs and poles have been placed within 3 feet of 
the roadway. Any vehicle straying from the roadway might have become 
involved in a collision with one of these fixed objects before the driver 
had time to recover control of his vehicle, and return it to the roadway.
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Many of these hazards could have been removed, or at least set back 
further from the road. In cases where this was not possible, or where 
dangerous ditches and embankments were located, guardrails could have 
been installed, or the roadway could have been redesigned for safer 
travel.
The second aspect of visibility is illumination. Studies have 
shown that unlighted highways were far more dangerous and had higher 
accident rates than lighted ones. This has been particularly true with 
the over 40-year old driver. Middle aged and older motorists have been 
involved in three times as many accidents resulting in injuries, when 
driving unlighted roads (81).
A study by Rex cited in The State of the Art of Traffic Safety (8), 
showed that illumination of 31 miles of main thoroughfare in Detroit 
reduced the night-to-day fatality ratio from 7 to 1 to 1.25 to 1.
Similar findings were reported in a 1948 study by Marsh, cited from 
the same source (8), for New Jersey and San Francisco.
In Chicago, a well lighted stretch of expressway had a death rate 
of only one-third the average for all American expressways. A study in 
Indianapolis showed that auto fatalities dropped 54 per cent after a new 
lighting system was installed. In Virginia, improved lighting at nine 
"high accident locations" cut accidents by 38 per cent and fatalities by
90 per cent (82). The need for good lighting was particularly critical
at intersections due to the heavy traffic load and the conflicting 
situations found at these locations.
The third aspect of visibility, glare, has been the most difficult
to control. Glare is produced by a number of factors, particularly
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weather conditions, bright sunlight, reflection from roadside lighting and 
the headlamps of oncoming vehicles. Tinted windshields have shown some 
merit in reducing this glare but there also are some highway design 
practices which could reduce much of the glare produced by artificial 
roadway lighting. The mounting of street lights higher above the roadway, 
often over 100 feet, reduces the angle of reflection which reduces glare 
and provides more even illumination of the roadway and roadside areas. 
Certain surfacing materials have been found to improve roadway visibility 
by reducing the glare from headlamps of oncoming vehicles.
Lane Widths
Lane width has played an important role in determining traffic 
flow and safety. Narrow lanes found in most urban areas were not built 
to accomodate the larger cars of today. On these older roads, there is 
a smaller margin of safety with regard to the amount of deviation allowed 
a vehicle before it collided with the vehicle in the adjoining lane. 
Current design standards permit lane widths of less than 12 feet but 
researchers have indicated 12 feet to be a desirable width for roadway 
lanes (8).
In many urban locations, this problem has become impossible to 
solve. The right-of-way on which most roads were originally constructed 
were not wide enough to allow improvement of the road width and the 
roadside area (12). This problem has become particularly critical at 
busy urban intersections where increased traffic volumes have necessitated 
wider and more complicated intersections.
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Road Surface
The road surface has always been one of the most important segments 
of the transportation system. The vehicle has to travel on the road 
surface and its properties have affected the economy, comfort and safety 
of motor travel. The surface can be smooth, providing comfort, but having 
a low coefficient of friction or it could be rough and uncomfortable but 
provide good traction.
The primary role of the road surface in accident causation has 
been through skidding. Skidding occurs either before or after thé 
application of the brakes, and quite often, both before and after the 
brakes are applied. Shelton (83) studied highway accidents in Virginia, 
and determined that 40 per cent of all accidents reported in 1 year 
involved skidding. In about one-third of those cases, skidding occurred 
before brake application. It was reasoned from this study that skidding 
was a contributing factor in accident causation.
A study of accidents in London revealed that about 70 per cent 
occurred at or within 20 yards of road junctions. It was also found that, 
due to the polish from the wheels of braking, turning or accelerating 
vehicles, the skid resistance at these sites fell off sharply as the 
junction was approached (84).
In Detroit, studies revealed that Michigan Avenue traffic was 
involved in an extraordinary number of accidents, of which about two- 
thirds were rear-end collisions, at the intersection with Clark Street. 
This portion of Michigan Avenue, which was paved with brick, was re­
surfaced, and the number of accidents greatly reduced. The year before 
resurfacing, there were 57 accidents at this location, the year after.
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only 18. The number of accidents occurring while the surface was wet 
dropped from 32 to 8 (85).
The amount of skidding which occurs on a road surface is directly 
related to the road's coefficient of friction. Coefficients of 0.6 and 
greater have provided good resistance to skidding; 0.5 to 0.6 has been 
rated satisfactory, 0.4 to 0.5 considered generally satisfactory, except 
under difficult conditions, and below 0.4 designated as potentially 
slippery (86).
Wet pavement has always been a problem with regard to skidding. 
Pavements of all types are more slippery when wet. The skidding hazard 
has been greatest during the first few minutes of rainfall that followed 
a period of dry weather. Slickness decreases greatly after a continued 
downpour (87).
Of the 34,390 state-wide total of reported accidents on West Virginia 
State Highway Systems for 1969, 10,267, about 30 per cent of the total, 
were at intersections. It was also found that nearly 3,500 of these 
occurred on wet pavements, and that only about 1,500 of the 3,500 would 
have occurred in a like period of time on dry pavement (88).
Table 12 shows the minimum stopping sight distances for both wet 
and dry pavements. Comparison of these values indicates that much longer 
distances are required for stopping on wet pavement that dry. At 64 miles 
per hour on wet pavement, over 700 feet is required to stop from the first 
sign of danger (89). This has created serious problems at intersections 
where drivers have not been able to stop prior to reaching a vehicle 
already stopped, or not being able to stop without sliding out into the 
intersection if front of cross traffic. Improvements in road surfaces
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TABLE 12
MINIMUM STOPPING SIGHT DISTANCES FOR WET AND DRY PAVEMENTS
Design
Speed
Assumed 
Speed for 
Conditions
Perception & 
Brake Reaction 
Time Distance
Coefficient 
of Friction
Braking 
Distance 
on Level
Stopping
Sight
Distance
mph mph sec. feet f feet feet
Wet Pavement
30 28 2.5 103 .36 73 176
40 36 2.5 132 .33 131 263
50 44 2.5 161 .31 208 369
60 52 2.5 191 .30 300 491
65 55 2.5 202 .30 336 538
70 58 2.5 213 .29 387 600
75 61 2.5 224 .28 443 667
80 64 2.5 235 .27 506 741
Dry Pavement
30 30 2.5 110 .62 48 158
40 40 2.5 147 .60 89 236
50 50 2.5 183 .58 144 327
60 60 2.5 220 .56 214 434
65 65 2.5 238 .56 251 489
70 70 2.5 257 .55 297 554
75 75 2.5 275 .54 347 622
80 80 2.5 293 . .53 403 696
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in order to increase stopping ability under all conditions and shorten 
the stopping sight distances, particularly on wet pavement have been 
needed for many years.
Many substances have been tried experimentally in an effort to 
increase road surface friction. These procedures have included both 
resurfacing with a roughened asphalt or concrete, or application of a 
chemical treatment to the existing road surface.
A study conducted by Hatherly and Lamb (84) evaluated the effect 
of the application of a resin/bauxite compound to a total of 41 road 
intersection sites. "Before and after" fatality and injury accidents 
were compared and it was found that the application of this resin/bauxite 
material reduced all accidents by 31 per cent. It caused a decrease of 
73 per cent in rear-end collisions, the most common type of intersection 
collision resulting from skidding. Accidents on wet roads decreased by 
almost 72 per cent and even accidents occurring on dry roads dropped 
by 7 per cent. The complete results of this study are contained in 
Table 13.
Another method of increasing friction which was tried experimentally 
was slotted roadways. This technique consisted of slots running in the 
same direction as the roadway cut about 2 inches apart into the road 
surface. The use of this procedure, particularly on sharp curves and 
high speed roadways has increased greatly in recent years. Little has 
been done through any of these means to improve the traction in the 
immediate vicinity of intersections where the danger of a skidding collision 
has been greatest.
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TABLE 13
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS BEFORE AND AFTER 
RESIN/BAUXITE TREATMENT
Before After Percentage Change
Total accidents 288 200 -31
Total casualties 337 258 -23
Accidents on wet roads 105 29 -72
Accidents on dry roads 183 171 - 7
Rear-end collisions 37 10 -73
Loss of control 23 7 -70
Crossing collisions 54 31 -43
Turning collisions 23 18 -22
Pedestrian accidents 76 65 -14
Other accidents 75 69 - 8
Rumble Strips
Rumble strips, which are raised and roughened stripes across the 
roadway, have been used primarily as a warning device in highway safety. 
Reductions in accident rates and changes in driver behavior have stemmed 
from the added visual, audible and tactile stimuli produced by such 
strips (90). These strips have been used to alert the driver to some 
particular hazard ahead, often over a hill or around a curve, which 
necessitated the vehicle stopping or slowing down. They have been quite 
effective since driver reaction times are generally faster in response to
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audible and tactile stimuli than they are to visual stimuli. Also, their 
cost has been low and installation relatively easy.
A study by Kermit (91) involved a T intersection between Third 
Avenue and Parr Boulevard in Richmond, California. In the 32 months prior 
to the installation of rumble strips, 15 accidents occurred at the inter­
section of which 13 were typically overrun in nature. During the 39 
months following the installation of these rumble strips, the number of 
accidents was cut in half. During the next 18 months only two accidents 
occurred at that location and the common overrun type of accident had 
completely disappeared.
Improvement Programs 
In an effort to make the nation's road system safer, the federal 
government instituted a set of Highway Safety Standards. As of June,
1972, not a single state had fully complied with all 16 federal standards 
for highway safety and, in many states, some standards have been ignored 
completely (92). In the same year, Pyle (93) reported that the state and 
community highway legislation, which was 6 years old, had only had 57.6 
per cent of its specified authorizations actually appropriated.
Through many types of research, the high density accident locations 
have been identified, and, as a rule, have sharp turns, obstructed vision 
or hazardous intersections. Defects of this type could have been repaired 
and saved many lives. This type of roadway improvement has come to be 
referred to as spot repairs.
Jorgensen and Laughland (10) found that highway safety benefit 
cost ratios and accident reductions as high as 80 to 90 per cent were 
possible from spot improvements. As was expected, relatively low cost
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projects ($20,000 or less) yielded the greatest safety benefit per dollar 
expended.
Tanner (94) calculated the rate of return on capital investment 
by comparing the monetary cost of the accidents saved with the capital 
costs of improvements made at 22 test sites. His results, found in 
Table 14, also emphasized the value of a program of spot elimination of 
road hazards.
TABLE 14
RATE OF CAPITAL RETURN FOR ROADWAY IMPROVEMENTS
Type of Change Percentage Reduction 
in Injury Accidents
Rate of Return on 
Capital-Percentage/Yr.
Realignment 80 15
Super elevation 60 70
Improved visibility 65 60
In addition to spot repairs, Baltimore County traffic control 
specialists have gone one step further. They have proposed a sur­
veillance program to include high density accident areas, and other 
locations such as sections of roadways with numerous skid marks, where 
drivers appeared to encounter frequent problems (95). This program was 
designed as a preventive measure to locate and alleviate road hazards 
before they proved fatal to some unsuspecting driver.
The federal government has taken an active part in making spot 
repairs through the TOPICS project (Traffic Operations Program to Increase
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Capacity and Safety), which has hoped to achieve its goals through such 
devices as improved signal systems, channelization, pavement marking, 
signing, turning lanes at intersections, installation of reversible lanes 
and control systems, upgrading of highway lighting, provision of bus 
turnouts and construction of pedestrian off highway grade separations at 
complex intersections (96).
The first completed TOPICS project in Dover, New Hampshire, reduced 
by 11 minutes what used to be a 15 minute trip for motorists through a 
heavily-traveled, 0.6-mile bottleneck. The project cost $103,400 and 
included such improvements as channelizing two key intersections, adding 
traffic signals at one, providing curb and gutter for driveway control, 
widening the bottleneck area from two to four lanes and painting pavement 
markings (97).
This project made some progress in eliminating environmental hazards, 
but a more concerted effort is necessary on the part of the state and local 
governments to attempt similar programs on their own. The environmental 
factors are one area where man could aid in reducing automobile accidents, 
injuries and deaths, but in most respects, the states have been very slow 
to adopt any constructive program in this area of traffic safety.
Human factors are difficult to work with in that many poor drivers 
can be removed from the roads by various measures, but even good drivers 
are involved in accidents. Many human factors are instantaneous variables, 
and not under the control of traffic safety specialists.
Great amounts of time and money have been invested in automobile 
safety devices which cannot prevent accidents, but only reduce injuries 
and fatalities. At the same time, these changes take 3 to 5 years to
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reach the production stage, and persons riding in older vehicles already 
on the road will never receive the benefit of these safety features.
Environmental research has been greatly limited and underfunded. 
This is extremely ironic, since improvements in environmental factors 
are relatively quickly realized in terms of accident prevention. This 
is in line with the basic principles of public health in promotion of 
health through preventive measures.
CHAPTER III
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Automobile accidents are probably this country's most important 
public health problem and could certainly be considered to be an epidemic. 
Motor vehicle collisions involve a tremendous financial loss in addition 
to over 50,000 fatalities and more than 2,000,000 injuries annually.
Much has been learned about accident causation and injury pro­
duction through research and experimentation. By the application of 
epidemiological techniques the three key factors in accident studies - 
the human, vehicle and environment - have been subjected to varying degrees 
of investigation.
Human factors have proven difficult to evaluate since they involved 
individual attitudes and behavior which vary with time, geographical 
region, and socio-economic class. Even good drivers have been involved 
in accidents, so removal of bad drivers from the roads would only provide 
a partial solution. The effect of alcohol on drivers has become an important 
consideration and has continued to increase in importance with regard to 
automobile collisions. Driver examination and licensing practices have 
been made more strict in an effort to improve the quality of drivers but 
human factors are difficult if not impossible for traffic safety researchers 
to control.
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Vehicle factors have been found to play a minor role in accident 
causation. In only a small percentage of the cases has a component mal­
function resulted in a collision. Most research in this area has been 
directed toward severity reduction through the incorporation of safety 
features into the vehicle design. This work has been only partially 
successful and has not brought about any measurable reduction in accident 
occurrence.
The third aspect of highway safety, the environment, has received 
little attention in comparison with the other two. However, this is the 
one area over which man has control. High density accident locations 
have been isolated and the hazardous components corrected or removed, 
bringing about a reduction in motor vehicle accidents.
It was the purpose of this research to investigate the environmental 
factors at high accident locations and to evaluate the role of such factors 
in accident causation. For this study the ten highest density accident 
locations in Oklahoma City for the year 1972 were determined. Police 
accident reports for each of these locations were examined and compared 
for similarities in human, vehicle and environmental causative factors.
The accident records for each location were analyzed to determine simi­
larity of occurrence and to develop theories concerning causative factors.
The second portion of this research involved detailed examination 
of the ten accident locations and analysis of all potential environmental 
causative factors. Next, these physical and environmental characteristics 
were related to the accident pattern at each particular location.
Through a cross comparison of these data, environmental factors 
which acted as contributory causes were identified and recommendations
61
made concerning remedial action to improve environmental conditions at 
these and similar intersections in order to decrease accident occurrence. 
These recommendations would also be applicable on a national scale and 
if utilized could bring about a nationally significant reduction in the 
occurrence of automobile accidents. This research could further be 
employed to effect design changes in an effort to avoid creating a 
dangerous driving environment through future construction.
CHAPTER IV 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
In this study, motor vehicle accidents in the Oklahoma City area 
were examined through information gathered from the Oklahoma City Police 
Department, the Oklahoma City Department of Traffic Control and on-site 
examination of accident locations. Additional information was obtained 
from the University of Oklahoma, Center for Safety Research, Multidisci­
plinary Accident Investigation Team.
A list of the ten highest density accident locations for the year 
1972 was obtained from the Oklahoma City Police Department's Record 
Bureau. These were, in order of decreasing accident occurrence:
a) Main and North Western,
b) Northwest Expressway and North Portland,
c) Southwest 74th and Pennsylvania,
d) Northwest 39th and May Avenue,
e) Northwest 36th and Meridian,
f) Northwest 23rd and Classen Boulevard,
g) Northwest Expressway and May Avenue,
h) West Expressway and Meridian,
i) Southeast 59th and High Street and
j) Reno and South Western (98).
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Each of these locations had 29 or more collisions during 1972, and the 
Main and Western location accounted for the greatest number with 40 
accidents. These locations were selected for this list according to the 
total number of accidents, rather than accident rate which is dependent 
on traffic volume.
The police accident reports for these locations, which totaled 
323 individual reports, were then assembled and examined to abstract 
certain facets of the official report. These reports contain information 
concerning the driver's condition, the vehicle condition and environ­
mental factors. The items which were evaluated were:
a) date of the collision,
b) day of the week when the collision occurred, 
cj time of day when the collision took place,
d) number of motor vehicles involved,
e) total property damage,
f) number of injuries,
g) number of fatalities,
h) use of lap and shoulder belts, 
completion of a driver training program,
j; vehicle condition,
k) type of traffic control at the accident location,
1) lighting conditions at the time of the accident, 
m; weather conditions,
road surface conditions, 
condition of the drivers, 
official cause and
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q) a brief description of how the collision occurred.
Information provided by the Oklahoma City Department of Traffic 
Control concerned signal sequencing at these ten locations, as well as 
signal sequencing at adjoining intersections included in the same traffic 
control network. The Department of Traffic Control also released the 
results of traffic flow and volume studies for these ten intersections.
A variety of data were collected through an in-depth examination 
of the intersections themselves. Those factors evaluated included:
a) road lane width,
b) signal sequencing, 
type of road surface,
d) condition of road surface,
e) roadside development,
f) roadside hazards, 
visual obstructions, 
roadway lighting, 
special turning lanes,
j; roadway markings and 
k) traffic control signs.
Data obtained from the Center for Safety Research consisted 
primarily of in-depth accident reports involving collisions at inter­
sections included in this study. These reports were available for three 
of the intersections being used in this study.
The information gathered from all sources was combined with regard 
to the individual accidents occurring at each intersection for the 
purpose of isolating both causative agents and those factors which increase
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injury severity. Intersection features which contributed to safety and 
injury severity reduction were also considered.
Based on these environmental hazards, recommendations,were made 
concerning corrective measures. These recommendations were determined 
by practicality of implementation and cost benefit relationship.
Following the examination of each accident site in detail, 
similarities concerning type of accident at each intersection were studied. 
Data from all ten locations were examined to locate environmental factors 
which were common contributors to accidents at other intersections 
throughout the Oklahoma City urban area. The ultimate goal of this 
investigation was to ascertain certain environmental characteristics 
which were primary or contributing causes to large numbers of accidents 
occurring not only at the study locations, but also at similar locations 
which could be found in any urban area.
CHAPTER V 
OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Initial Observations 
Analysis of the accumulated data involved all three major areas 
of concern; the driver, the vehicle and the environment. The use of 
records of past accident experience as a predictor of future accident 
occurrence, and therefore as an indicator of necessary remedial action, 
is an accepted approach in the highway safety area (99). A total of 323 
Oklahoma City Police accident reports were examined for information 
concerning the official cause of the accident. A sample accident form 
appears in Appendix A. These data are summarized in Table 15.
The most common official cause of accidents was listed as "failure 
to yield," which implied a basic conflict between two vehicles. These 
collisions were attributed to driver error, when this intersectional 
conflict could have been resolved through redesign of environmental 
factors. The other most frequently used explanation was inattention, a 
vague and nondefinitive explanation which could have been more appropriately 
designated as distraction. The driver may not have been paying attention, 
but it was most likely due to a preoccupation with some facet of his 
driving environment. A more in-depth investigation should have been made 
to isolate the actual causative factors.
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TABLE 15
OFFICIAL CAUSES - OKLAHOMA CITY TOP TEN ACCIDENT LOCATIONS BY PERCENTAGE - 1972
Intersection Fail to 
Yield
Inat­
tention
Follow
Closely
Unknown Change
Lanes
Fail to 
Stop
Faulty
Vehicle
Improper
Turn
Other
Main & Western 53 8 10 10 10 5 3 3 0
NW Exp. & Portland 43 22 14 5 5 5 0 0 5
SW 74 & Penn. 50 17 11 6 3 3 3 3 6
NW 39 & May 48 15 15 3 3 3 6 6 0
NW 36 6e Meridian 80 3 3 3 6 0 0 0 3
NW 23 & Classen 33 30 10 6 0 10 0 3 6
NW Exp. & May 3 73 20 0 0 0 0 3 0
W Exp. & Meridian 27 31 17 10 0 0 6 0 6
SE 59 & High 66 6 3 3 6 6 0 6 0
Reno & Western 45 12 6 9 17 0 3 3 0
Averages 45 21 11 6 5 3 2 2 2
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Definite failure or incapacity with regard to the human variable 
was noted in only 24 out of 669 drivers. At most, this could have ac­
counted for only 7.4 per cent of the accidents occurring at the study 
locations. Of these 24 drivers, 21 were listed as driving under the 
influence of alcohol, and one each as aged, tired or asleep. The remaining 
645 drivers were reported by the investigating officer to be normal.
The official accident reports also indicated that only 32 per cent 
of the drivers involved in those collisions under study had completed an 
approved course in driver training. It was not possible to determine 
conclusively whether or not such a course would have prevented the oc­
currence of these existing accidents. Of the 669 drivers involved in 
these 323 collisions, there were 215 drivers who had participated in a 
driver training course. Of these 215 drivers, 94, or 44 per cent, were 
found to be at fault in causing the collision. This does not indicate
that driver training was a significant factor in accident reduction. A
more detailed description of these data is included in Table 16.
Vehicle malfunctions were reported to be present in only 12 vehicles, 
or 2 per cent of the 669 vehicles included in this study. From these
results, it does not appear that vehicle malfunctions are responsible for
more than a very small number of motor vehicle collisions.
Much of the effort in the field of motor vehicle safety has been 
devoted to automobile crash-worthiness and injury-reducing features, such 
as seat and shoulder belts. A survey of the police accident reports 
yielded some information in this area. Of the 556 vehicles equipped with 
seat belts, only 29 per cent of the drivers reported that they were 
wearing them at the time of the collision (Table 16). The use of shoulder
TABLE 16 
HUMAN AND VEHICLE FACTORS
Intersection Number of 
Vehicles 
Involved
Percentage Use 
Lap Shoulder 
Belts Belts
Percentage Drivers 
Completing Driver 
Training Course
Abnormal
Vehicle
Condition
Driving 
Under the 
Influence
Main & Western 81 35 9 . 28 1 5
NW Exp. & Portland 79 39 0 33 0 3
SW 74 & Penn. 76 26 0 28 3 3
NW 39 & May 70 19 4 47 3 1
NW 36 & Meridian 64 42 5 27 0 1
NW 23 & Classen 65 16 0 27 0 6
NW Exp. & May 60 46 0 35 0 0
W Exp. & Meridian 58 29 10 41 5 9
BE 59 & High 58 26 0 28 3 3
Reno & Western 58 25 7 29 3 0
Totals 669 29 3 32 2 3
o\
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belts was even more discouraging with only 3 per cent of the drivers 
whose vehicles were equipped with shoulder belts reporting that they 
were in use at the time of the collision. Despite this situation, the 
number of people injured was still relatively small» most likely as a 
result of low vehicle speeds at the time of the collision and not ap­
parently due to the use of lap and shoulder belts.
With only 5 per cent of the collisions attributed to driver error
and vehicle malfunction, the remaining 95 per cent had no apparent 
causative agent. As shown in Table 15, official causes, as reported on 
the police accident reports, were extremely vague. These included driving 
characteristics such as failure to yield, inattention, improper lane 
changing, following too closely or improper turning.
It is highly unlikely that any driver has ever gone through a stop 
sign or red light knowing that he was going to be involved in a collision. 
There must have been something that led him to believe he would not be 
involved in a collision. Therefore, his action of failing to yield was 
not a cause, but rather, it was a result of the information he perceived
as he approached the intersection. It becomes important to determine
what factors of the environment might have caused the driver to incor­
rectly perceive his surroundings.
It has been shown that freeways have fewer accidents than urban 
areas (100). This is due to the number of points of confusion and 
potential conflict commonly occurring at urban intersections.
An in-depth investigation of the ten intersections in this study 
showed numerous environmental defects at each location, which contributed 
in varying degrees to accident causation. All of these intersections
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were high-volume intersections, accommodating from 16,000 to over 45,000 
vehicles per day. Although the defects at each location were respectively 
related to different environmental problems, all were correctable with 
the expected result of marked accident reduction.
Each intersection being unique, it was important to evaluate each 
one independently, and to recommend specific solutions for the problems 
identified at each location. Data concerning these locations are contained 
in Tables 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21.
Main and North Western 
The intersection at Main and North Western (Figure 4) involved the 
major downtown artery in Oklahoma City and a heavily traveled north-south 
route which extended to both the northern and southern borders of the city. 
The streets were each four lanes wide, with the exception of the area east 
of the intersection. This segment of the roadway was six lanes in width, 
and it incorporated four westbound lanes leading out of the downtown area. 
There were special lanes on Main Street for making left turns, one from 
the west and two from the east, although, there was no left turn signal 
phase. The roadway surface was asphalt and generally in fair to poor con­
dition with numerous cracks, patches and deep gutters on all four corners. 
Pavement markings were of paint and quite worn.
The roadside environment was of a commercial nature with business 
establishments on all four corners. There were no outstanding visibility 
obstructions, with the possible exception of a building on the southwest 
corner which was within 6 feet of the street. There were several tele­
phone and light poles within 3 feet of the curb which could have been 
dangerous fixed objects to any vehicle leaving the roadway.
TABLE 17
SUMMARY COLLISION DATA - TOP TEN ACCIDENT LOCATIONS
Intersection No. of No. Est. Ave. Tvnes of Collisions
Acc. Inj. Prop.
Dam./$
Prop. 
Dam. / $
Rear-
End
Right
Angle
Left
Turn
Side
Swipe
Fixed
Object
Other
Main & Western 40 8 21,905 548 8 19 10 3 0 0
NW Exp. & Portland 37 13 22,855 618 15 5 14 2 1 0
SW 74 & Penn. 36 10 18,765 521 9 12 15 0 0 0
NW 39 & May 33 3 19,715 597 11 9 12 1 0 0
NW 36 & Meridian 30 11 20,095 670 3 3 23 1 0 0
NW 23 & Classen 30 4 17,780 593 10 4 15 0 0 1
NW Exp. & May 30 1 9,160 305 28 1 0 0 0 1
W Exp. & Meridian 29 11 16,690 575 12 6 7 0 4 0
SE 59 & High 29 4 15,970 550 3 14 8 3 1 0
Renc & Western 29 2 13,035 450 6 14 3 6 0 0
Totals 323 67 175,970 545 105 87 107 16 6 2
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table 18
ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE BY DAY OF WEEK
Intersection Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun.
Main & Western 3 7 4 6 7 8 5
NW Exp. 6c Portland 3 2 7 9 8 4 4
SW 74 6c Penn. 1 2 7 3 10 5 8
NW 39 6c May 5 2 5 3 7 7 4
NW 36 6c Meridian 8 0 6 4 7 2 3
NW 23 6c Classen 4 4 6 3 3 7 3
NW Exp. 6c May 4 5 7 1 7 3 3
W Exp. 6c Meridian 0 5 6 2 6 4 5
SE 59 6c High 1 4 5 5 7 5 2
Reno 6e Western 6 5 3 5 5 2 3
Totals 35 36 56 41 67 47 41
TABLE 19
ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE BY TIME OF DAY
Intersection 11:01 
1 AM
1:01 
3 AM
3:G1 
5 AM
S:G1 
7 AM
7:G1 
9 AM
9:G1 
11 AM
11: G1 
1 PM
1;
3
G1
PM
3:G1 
5 PM
5:01 
7 PM
7:01 
9 PM
9:01 
11 PM
Main & Western 3 1 G 1 4 6 6 6 6 3 2 2
NW Exp. & Portland 2 1 G G 4 3 7 6 6 1 3 4
SW 74 & Penn. 3 1 G 1 G 5 6 3 8 5 3 1
NW 39 & May 2 0 G G 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4
NW 36 & Meridian 1 0 G G 3 6 3 4 5 3 3 2
NW 23 & Classen 1 0 G G 2 4 7 2 6 3 2 3
NW Exp. & May 0 G G G 3 2 6 6 7 3 1 2
W Exp. & Meridian 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 5 6 5 1 2
SE 59 & High 2 G G G 8 2 3 3 2 7 G 2
Reno & Western 0 G G 1 2 G 9 4 6 5 1 1
Totals 16 5 1 4 3G 33 53 44 55 40 20 23
•P'
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TABLE 20
TOTAL DAILY TRAFFIC VOLUME BY INTERSECTION
Intersection  Daily Traffic Volume________  Annual
Total Major St. Minor St, Volume
Main & Western 31,827 11,365 20,462 11,616,855
NW Exp. & Portland 33,040 20,358 12,682 12,059,600
Penn. & SW 74 (N) 18,937 14,063 4,874 6,912,005
(S) 19,423 14,378 5,045 7,089,395
May 6e NW 39 (N) 29,512 24,621 4,891 10,771,880
(S) 28,740 25,251 3,489 10,496,100
Meridian & NW 36 29,559 19,100 10,459 10,789,035
Classen & NW 23 45,733 30,296 15,437 16,692,545
May & NW Exp.* 43,186 20,158 23,028 15,762,890
W Exp. & Meridian 39,718 23,441 16,277 14,497,070
SE 59 & High 16,527 14,588 1,939 6,032,355
Western &. Reno
& Exchange
33,383 19,513 9,818
4,052
12,184,795
* Values approximated through use of data for adjoining intersections.
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TABLE 21
ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000 VEHICLES
Intersection Accident Rate Per 
100,000 Vehicles
SE 59 & High 0.483
Main & Western 0.345
NW Exp. & Portland 0.306
NW 36 & Meridian 0.278
SW 74 & Pennsylvania 0.257
NW Exp. & May* 0.242
Reno & Western 0.237
W Exp. & Meridian 0.200
NW 23 & Classen 0.179
NW 39 & May 0.157
* Value approximated through use of data for adjoining intersections,
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The traffic signals operated on a normal red, green, yellow sequence 
with no turning or all red phases. They were located so as to be clearly 
visible, and they were not found to be malfunctioning at the time of any 
of the reported collisions. All directions received an equal 30-second 
green phase, 5-second yellow phase and 35-second red phase.
Main Street was the major street at this intersection and received 
priority through the traffic actuated signal system, but it had a traffic 
volume only slightly over half that of North Western which was classified 
as the minor street. Traffic volume studies showed that peak hours for 
this intersection occurred between 7:30 and 8:30 in the morning and 4:00 
and 5:30 in the afternoon. A detailed breakdown of traffic flow at each 
intersection is contained in Appendix B.
The occurrence of collisions showed no clear relationship to these 
peak periods due to the consistently heavy flow of traffic resulting from 
the proximity of this intersection to the downtown area. The distribution 
of collisions according to the days of the week (Table 18) was relatively 
normal compared to all accidents in the Oklahoma City area (Figure 1).
This intersection was credited with the largest number of accidents 
in 1972, a total of 40, although, when compared with traffic volume, its 
accident rate (Table 21) was actually second highest among the ten inter­
sections investigated. As shown in Table 17, the most prominent type of 
collision at this intersection was the right angle type, with rear-end 
and head-on from left turn collisions contributing about equal numbers.
There appeared to be no single feature at this location which led 
to the large number of collisions,- but rather, there was a combination of 
features resulting from the confusion caused by poor design.
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The most common type of collision was the right angle type, which 
normally are few in number at signalized intersections (64). Of 19 right 
angle collisions, 16 of them involved a northbound vehicle. There was 
the possibility of a visibility obstruction, but the cause was more likely 
a resultant of the signal phasing and the intersection size.
Right angle collisions normally occur at a change in the signal 
phases. With only a 5-second yellow light, it was likely that many vehicles 
entering the intersection during a yellow light phase would not be able to 
clear the intersection by the time the red light phase occurred. The 
possibility of this taking place was increased by the width of the inter­
section. Traveling at the speed limit on North Western, 30 miles per hour, 
it would take approximately 2 seconds for a vehicle just to cross the 
intersection. However, lengthening the yellow phase would not eliminate 
right angle collisions since the conflict of the changing signal phases 
would not have been resolved.
Seven of the ten left turning collisions also involved traffic on 
North Western. This was primarily a result of the lack of special left 
turn lanes and turning signal phases. On Main Street, where pavement 
arrows indicated turning lanes, the number of left turn accidents was 
significantly lower than on North Western.
Rear-end collisions are common at signalized intersections. The 
best preventive measure has been found to be a series of intersections 
with interconnected signals providing an even traffic flow. This type 
of system creates a situation where a platoon of vehicles reaches the 
intersection while the light is green. If stopping is reduced, so are 
rear-end collisions.
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Another characteristic of this location which contributed to two 
collisions was the double left turn lane on Main Street. Two vehicles 
making a left turn, side by side, with no lane markings to guide them, 
have an increased opportunity for collision. This situation could have 
been easily rectified by providing lane markings or limiting the left 
turning movements to a single lane.
The following remedial measures were recommended in an effort to 
reduce the frequency of collisions at this intersection:
a) convert the north and southbound passing lanes to left turn lanes, 
and equip the entire intersection with left turn signal phasing,
b) connect this intersection to other intersections in a network to 
promote smoothness of flow and a reduction in rear-end collisions,
c) eliminate one of the left turn lanes on the westbound side of 
Main Street,
d) introduce a 5-second all red phase to reduce the number of vehi­
cles caught in the intersection on a signal change, thus compen­
sating for the short yellow phase and
e) install new pavement markings for better traffic separation.
Northwest Expressway and North Portland
Northwest Expressway and North Portland (Figure 5) were both major 
arteries for access to downtown Oklahoma City, although the intersection 
was actually located approximately 4 miles from the center of the downtown 
area. Each street was a four lane roadway, and the Expressway also had a 
median and a single left turning lane.
The speed limit on the Expressway was 50 miles per hour, and on
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Portland it was 40 miles per hour. The road surface on both streets was 
asphalt and in relatively good condition. The pavement markings were 
quite visible, although the southbound lane on Portland had no markings 
to separate the two lanes.
The roadside area was fairly open, and it was a combination of 
commercial and residential development. There were no fixed visibility 
obstructions on either roadway; however, vehicles stopped on Portland, 
waiting to make a left turn, often obscurred the vision of oncoming drivers, 
particularly those who were also making a left turn. The traffic signals 
were actuated signals, allowing a longer green phase on the Expressway 
and use of the left turn phase only when needed. Traffic signs permitted 
all but northbound travel to make a right turn on a red light, and the 
northbound traffic could make a similar movement by the use of a cut-off 
coupled with a yield sign.
Traffic volume studies showed that the daily volume for this inter­
section was over 33,000 vehicles (Table 20), with the peak hours being 
7:30 to 8:30 in the morning and 4:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon. The increase 
in traffic beginning at the noon hour was reflected in the increased 
occurrence of accidents during that time period. Accidents occurred 
throughout the week (Table 18) at this location according to the normal 
pattern for Oklahoma City (Figure 1). Based on the intersectional traffic 
volume, the accident rate per 100,000 vehicles was the third highest among 
those intersections examined.
The injury rate and property damage were relatively high due to the 
high speed limits on both roadways. The two prevalent types of collisions 
here were rear-end and head-on collisions from a left turn (Table 17) with
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smaller numbers of right angle and side swipe collisions. There was also 
one fixed object collision out of the 37 occurring at this location.
The most obvious problem at this intersection was the need for 
left turn lanes and signal phases on North Portland. All 14 left turn 
collisions at this site occurred on North Portland which has no left turn 
provisions. Not a single left turn accident occurred on the Expressway 
which was equipped with both left turn lanes and signal phasing. The 
cost in property damage alone of these 14 accidents was over $7000 in 
1972, which would have paid for the installation of the proper left turn 
equipment. An alternative measure of changing the signal phasing to allow 
the northbound and southbound traffic to advance at separate times would 
remove the conflict for left turning vehicles and achieve the same results.
The rear-end collisions were distributed relatively evenly among 
the northbound, eastbound and westbound traffic with no rear-end collisions 
being attributed to the southbound traffic. This was accounted for by the 
high speeds of travel of all but the southbound vehicles. The southbound 
lanes led from a low speed residential area, and traffic was already moving 
at a slow rate as it approached the intersection. Synchronization of this 
intersection with adjoining ones would significantly reduce rear-end 
collisions.
An additional environmental factor involved at this intersection 
was a slight hill sloping upward for the eastbound traffic, just west of 
the intersection. The crest of this hill has been shown to obstruct the 
eastbound driver's view of brake lights at the intersection only a few 
hundred feet ahead. Since this traffic was of a high speed nature, this 
distance was sufficient to create a stopping problem.
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There were no right turn related accidents, although all four 
directions were permitted right turns on a red light. This indicated 
the safety of this maneuver and its advantages to increasing traffic flow.
Recommendations for this location were:
a) the installation of a left turn system on North Portland, or 
adaptation of the signal sequence to allow north and southbound 
traffic to advance at alternate times,
b) the interconnection of this locality with other intersections to 
provide a more even traffic flow, particularly during the rush 
hour, and reduce rear-end collisions,
c) the use of a 5-second all red signal phase to reduce right angle 
collisions and
d) the installation of a warning device or rumble strip for eastbound 
traffic to alert drivers of a stop at the crest of the hill.
Southwest 74th and South Pennsylvania
This intersection involved the problems of two separate inter­
sections. Southwest 74th was an access road in the form of a two lane, 
two-way roadway located on both sides of a divided highway. The four lane 
divided highway was constructed on an overpass over South Pennsylvania. 
South Pennsylvania was a four lane, two-way undivided roadway constructed 
perpendicularly to Southwest 74th Street. This location included two 
intersections, one on the north and one on the south side of the highway, 
connected by an underpass. As shown in Figure 6, the north side of the 
intersection consisted of two lanes in the east-west direction, four lanes 
in the north-south direction plus a left turn lane for northbound vehicular 
movement. Almost all of the lanes exceeded the 12-foot recommended width.
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The south side was of similar design and construction having a left turn 
lane for southbound traffic. Pavement markings were In fair to good 
condition, although the southbound area between the north and south sides 
had no lane divisions.
Both sides of the crossing were signal controlled, but did not 
utilize either a left turn phase or an all red phase. The two Inter­
sections were Interconnected to allow traffic to clear both segments of 
the Intersection on the same signal phase and avoid creating a bottleneck. 
As an added safety measure, a traffic Island was constructed to separate 
the north and southbound traffic throughout this area.
The roadway surface was concrete In some areas and asphalt In 
others. The entire Intersection was surrounded by a 6-lnch curb, which 
was the only protection from the several poles and concrete bridge 
abutments, all within 4 feet of the roadway. The roadside area was 
commercial In nature with several gasoline stations and shopping areas.
Turning motor vehicles at this Intersection created an exceptional 
hazard. In addition to Southwest 74th Street being a through street. It 
also served as an access route to the highway which greatly Increased the 
left turning volume at this location.
Being further removed from the downtown area, the peak hours for 
traffic flow were earlier In the morning, 7:00 to 8:00, and later In the 
evening, 5:00 to 6:00. The majority of the collisions occurred during 
the afternoon, both before and during the rush period (Table 19). Friday 
was the day of the week when the largest number of accidents took place, 
which was consistent with other study locations. This Intersection 
accounted for the fifth highest accident rate based on traffic volume
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(Table 21).
The most common collision configuration was, once again, the head- 
on from a left turn (Table 17), which was expected due to the large volume 
of left turning traffic. The second most frequent type of collision was 
the right angle impact, normally a rarity at signalized intersections (64). 
This indicated a basic design flaw in the intersection construction.
No more than one left turning collision happened at each possible 
point of conflict, with the exception of one. This remaining point of 
conflict was responsible for nine left turn collisions and was the least 
likely of all for this poor record. These nine collisions all involved 
the north side of the intersection where a left turn lane was provided 
for northbound traffic to aid in channelization. This site appeared an 
even greater problem, since 25 per cent of the 36 collisions occurred 
there, while only 2.7 per cent of the total traffic at this intersection 
was involved in making a left turn at that point.
This pattern became explicable when the high accident rate was 
correlated with the time of occurrence of these nine collisions. All 
but one took place between 3:00 and 7:00 in the afternoon, when left turn 
traffic would have had to cross a heavy southbound flow away from the city. 
The simplest solution to this situation would be to initiate a separate 
left turn signal phase to allow these vehicles to cross in safety. This 
action would have a similar beneficial effect on other areas of this 
intersection with regard to left turn collisions.
Analysis of the right angle collisions introduced a new environ­
mental hazard. Three of these right angle collisions involved vehicles 
entering busy South Pennsylvania from gasoline stations and shopping
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areas. One method of reducing such accidents would have been to place 
entrances and exits for these commercial facilities as far away from the 
intersection as possible. This would have given the drivers of these 
entering and exiting vehicles a better view of the traffic flow and 
simplified their driving maneuvers. The remainder of the right angle 
collisions could have been eliminated through the use of an all red signal 
phase. An all red signal phase would compensate for the poor intersection 
design and be far less expensive than a reconstruction program.
Approximately 44 per cent of the rear-end collisions occurred on 
the access road, Southwest 74th Street. There was no particular time 
relationship or other common factor except for speed. Although only a 
two lane road. Southwest 74th Street was straight and level and no speed 
limit signs were present for over a mile both east and west of South 
Pennsylvania. Excessive speed on this road would have made it difficult 
to stop suddenly on approaching the intersection. The number of rear-end 
impacts could have been greatly reduced by synchronized intersection 
signals, which would have reduced the need for sudden stopping. It is 
accepted that signalized intersections will have more rear-end accidents 
than non-signalized ones, but traffic control engineers could still do 
much to reduce the number of such occurrences (64).
Recommendations for accident reduction at this intersection were:
a) initiation of a left turn signal phase for traffic traveling 
both north and south on Pennsylvania,
b) limiting and redirecting turning movements into and out of com­
mercial establishments, particularly with regard to relocating 
these turning areas to points as far away from the intersection
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as possible,
. c) placement of speed limit signs, as well as "stop ahead" signs,
on Southwest 74th Street both east and west of the intersection,
d) synchronization of the intersection with adjoining ones to speed 
vehicular flow,
e) initiation of a 5-second all red phase to reduce angle collisions 
and
f) application of lane markings in the southbound lane of Pennsyl­
vania and on the three sections of Southwest 74th Street which 
are presently unmarked.
Northwest 39th Street and May Avenue 
The Northwest 39th Street and May Avenue intersection (Figure 7) 
had many similarities to Southwest 74th Street and Pennsylvania. It was 
a double intersection with signal lights at both the north and south
sides. The east-west street also served as an access road to a divided
highway. The location was subject to a very heavy flow of vehicles, of 
which over 75 per cent was on May Avenue (Table 20) , May Avenue crossed 
a concrete bridge with concrete side walls located between the two sides 
of the intersection. This bridge formed an overpass over a four lane 
divided highway.
The most outstanding problem at this intersection was confusion.
Not only was the intersection itself complicated, but the roadside en­
vironment was not conducive to safe vehicular operation. The area was 
highly commercialized for several blocks both north and south of the 
intersection. These establishments included four automobile dealerships, 
four gasoline stations and three restaurants, all of which involved heavy
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traffic flow and complex traffic patterns. A multitude of painted and 
neon signs added to the visibility problem.
The roadway was surfaced with asphalt, which was in fair condition, 
while the painted roadway markings were badly worn. The speed limit on 
May Avenue was 40 miles per hour, and on Northwest 39th Street, It was 30 
miles per hour. There were no special left or right turn lanes on either 
road.
Traffic was controlled at both the north and south sides of the 
Intersection by traffic signals of the standard type. They were synchro­
nized to allow traffic entering one side of the Intersection on May Avenue 
to clear the other side during the same signal phase. There was no left 
turn signal sequence on either side of the Intersection. Signs prohibited 
northbound vehicles from making left turns at the north side of the inter­
section, while similar signs were In force for the southbound traffic at 
the south side of the Intersection. These left turn prohibitions were In 
effect from 4:00 to 6:00 in the evening. Despite this restriction, left 
turn collisions were the most common type at this location.
Vehicle flow studies have Indicated a daily traffic volume of over 
58,000 vehicles between both sides of this Intersection. Based on this 
extremely heavy vehicular flow, the accident rate per 100,000 vehicles 
was 0.137, or the lowest of those Intersections examined. Most probably 
there were other Intersections In the city with higher accident rates 
although their total number of collisions was smaller.
Accident Incidence with regard to day of the week was similar to 
the experience for Oklahoma City as a whole (Table 18) (Figure 1). 
Collisions at this Intersection occurred evenly throughout most of the
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day as would have been anticipated due to the extremely heavy vehicle flow 
through this entire area.
In 33 accidents at this intersection, only 3 injuries were recorded, 
which indicated that the speed of the vehicles at the time of the impact 
was comparatively low. The nature of collisions arising most frequently 
were equally distributed among rear-end, right angle and left turn 
configurations.
Rear-end collisions at this locale would have been difficult to 
eradicate, because of the complexity of the entire system, but signal 
synchronization with other intersections, both north and south of 39th 
Street, would most likely have a beneficial effect on their frequency of 
occurrence.
Of the nine right angle collisions, eight took place on the south 
side of the intersection involving a southbound vehicle and an eastbound 
vehicle. Of the eight southbound vehicles, six were traveling in the 
right lane. The importance of this configuration was that both drivers 
were well screened from each other by the concrete bridge sidings. These 
right angle collisions involved signal changes, and removal of the concrete 
wall to improve vision would be very difficult and expensive. A solution 
might be to make use of an all red signal phase of several seconds duration 
to permit the vehicles that had entered one side of the intersection to 
clear the other side before the cross traffic was released.
The most numerous type of collision, once again, involved left 
turning vehicles. Of ten left turn accidents involving May Avenue, only 
one involved a southbound vehicle at the south side of the intersection, 
while nine involved northbound vehicles at the north side of the inter-
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section. Daily, left turn traffic volumes from either side of the 
intersection were nearly equal, so another factor must have been re­
sponsible for this large difference.
North of the intersection was a hill sloping up to the intersection. 
Vehicles ascending that slope would not have been visible for more than 
a short distance prior to reaching the intersection. A driver making a 
left turn at this point might have had a difficult time estimating the 
approach speed of such a vehicle. This situation was further complicated 
by an intervening lane of southbound traffic. In all nine instances, 
the vehicle striking the left turning one was in the extreme right, 
southbound lane. Between the hill and the traffic in the second, southbound 
lane creating visibility problems, a very dangerous situation was created. 
Once again, a left turn signal phase would have permitted vehicles to 
complete their left turn movement in safety.
Recommendations for this intersection were very similar to those 
for each of the preceeding locations. They were:
a) the prohibition of all left turning movements, or the initiation 
of a left turn lane and signal phase,
b) the utilization of an all red phase of several seconds duration, 
due to the width of the intersection,
c) the use of signal synchronization to improve traffic flow 
characteristics,
d) the limitation of turning movements with reference to commercial 
establishments and
e) the removal of some of the clutter of surplus route signs and 
other roadside accessories, as well as those commercial adver-
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tising signs which have proven distracting or confusing to 
motorists.
Northwest 36th and North Meridian 
This intersection (Figure 8) was comprised of two streets inter­
secting at right angles. Each roadway consisted of four lanes, all of 
which met the recommended 12-foot width. The road surface was asphalt 
on both streets and in relatively good condition, although, the pavement 
markings, which were of paint, were badly worn in some places and moderately 
worn throughout the remainder of the area.
The surroundings were predominantly residential, with private 
dwellings situated on three corners, and a vacant lot on the fourth corner. 
With the exception of the northwest corner, visibility obstructions, in 
the form of large trees, were in evidence.
The speed limit on both roadways was 40 miles per hour, and traffic, 
particularly northbound on Meridian, regularly exceeded this limit. Me­
ridian was one of the major access routes to downtown Oklahoma City, and 
there were no traffic signals within a mile to the south of this inter­
section. This situation allowed northbound vehicles to attain high speeds 
prior to arriving at the Northwest 36th and Meridian intersection.
The intersection was controlled by traffic signals with two 
signal faces for each approach, one pole mounted on the right side of 
the roadway and the other suspended from a mast-arm over the center of 
the two lanes which it controlled. The signal phasing was normal with no 
left or right turn phases. It was a traffic actuated system, and allowed 
twice as much green time to the traffic on Meridian. Pole mounted signs 
on the right side of the road allowed the northbound, southbound and
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eastbound vehicles to make a right turn on a red light after stopping.
The daily traffic volume for this location was just under 30,000 
vehicles (Table 20), of which more than 70 per cent was on Meridian. The 
traffic flow was particularly heavy between 3:00 and 6:00 in the afternoon 
when over 45 per cent of the daily vehicular flow occurred. The accident 
rate per 100,000 vehicles was 0.278, or fourth highest of those inter­
sections studied.
In 30 collisions at this intersection, there were 11 injuries, 
second highest among the 10 locations surveyed. The average property 
damage per collision was the highest of these 10 locations at $670 (Table 
17). These two factors appeared to be the result of the relatively high 
vehicular speeds on Meridian.
One type of collision was so dominant at this site as to make the 
others almost insignificant. Of the 30 reported accidents, 23 of them 
were of the head-on from a left turn variety.
Of these 23 left turn accidents,only 3 took place on Northwest 
36th Street, and the remaining 20 occurred on Meridian. Sixteen of the 
20 accidents on Meridian involved a southbound vehicle making a left burn 
and being struck by a northbound vehicle. On all but two of these occasions 
the northbound vehicle was traveling in the right lane, which made it more 
difficult for the turning operator to perceive.
The major problem at this location appeared to be twofold. Left 
turns have always been hazardous, but coupled with high speed oncoming 
traffic and a visibility obstruction in the form of the second lane of 
northbound traffic, the increasing frequency of this manner of collision 
was inevitable. Based on the volume of left turning vehicles, the acci-
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dent rate was 8.1 per 100,000 southbound, left turning vehicles, or more 
than 29 times as great as the rate for the intersection as a whole 
(0.278).
The northbound traffic making a left turn was comparable, but only 
four collisions occurred involving these vehicles. This further supported 
the importance of speed as a contributing factor at this location.
The three right angle collisions all involved the corners of the 
intersection where a visibility obstruction was present. Although this 
was not the primary cause, it was most likely a contributing factor.
Recommendations for reducing the number of accidents at this 
intersection were;
a) the installation of "no left turn" signs for traffic on Meridian, 
or the establishment of signal phasing to allow the northbound 
and southbound traffic to move at different times (a cost benefit 
analysis of this type of improvement would produce highly favor­
able results),
b) the use of an all red signal phase to minimize right angle 
collisions,
c) the reduction or strict enforcement of the speed limit on Meridian,
d) use of thermoplastic or other plastic lane markings to provide 
better channelization and
e) the removal of the trees which provided a visibility obstruction 
was not recommended, since these right angle collisions could
be alleviated in another manner without affecting the aesthetic 
value of the trees to the roadside environment.
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Northwest 23rd Street and Classen Boulevard
Northwest 23rd and Classen Boulevard (Figure 9) was characterized 
as being a heavily traveled locality. Classen Boulevard was a main access 
route to the downtown area, and Northwest 23rd Street was a principal 
east-west commercial route.
Classen Boulevard was a six lane roadway, with an additional lane 
in both directions specifically for left turns. North and southbound 
traffic were separated by a median. Northwest 23rd Street consisted of 
four lanes, two in each direction. Both roadways were asphalt surfaced 
with some cracks and patches, but the intersection as a whole was in 
relatively good condition. The lane markings were moderately faded, and 
the lane widths were quite irregular, contributing to the traffic flow 
problems.
Traffic control devices included pole mounted signals for all traffic 
with separate signal faces on the north-south median indicating a green 
arrow for left turns. The signals on Classen were part of a system on 
that roadway, and traffic in the north-south direction also received a 
longer green phase than east-west moving vehicles. Motorists on Classen 
also had the opportunity to make a right turn on a red light after 
stopping. Left turns by east-west traffic were prohibited at all times 
through the employment of "no left turn" signs. The speed limit on Classen 
was 35 miles per hour and on Northwest 23rd, 30 miles per hour.
The surrounding environment was almost totally commercial with 
many driveways and distractions. This was just one more factor con­
tributing to the confusion surrounding vehicle movement through this area.
This intersection had the second highest total daily traffic volume
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of all those studied, and correspondingly, the second lowest accident 
rate (Table 21). The peak hours for vehicular flow were 7:30 to 8:30 
in the morning, and 5:00 to 6:00 in the evening rush hour. Accidents 
at this location occurred predominantly during the noon hour and in the 
late afternoon, and generally, earlier in the week than the distribution 
for Oklahoma City as a whole.
Of the 30 accidents reported by investigating officers, left turn 
and rear-end accidents were the most common. Due to the fairly low speeds 
of the vehicles, the number of injuries was minimal (Table 17).
The large number of left turn collisions on Classen seemed unusual, 
since Classen had both a left turn lane and signal phase. The times at 
which these collisions took place were dispersed throughout the day, and 
were not solely a product of rush hour traffic.
The common factor seemed to be the length of the left turn phase 
which was only 10 seconds in length. No more than two or three vehicles 
could cross the intersection on a single phase and after a lengthy wait 
in the left turn lane, many vehicles attempted a left turn even after the 
signal had turned red, creating a conflict with the oncoming traffic. 
Because of the heavy traffic volume, it would be very impractical to 
eliminate left turns completely. Although regulation of north-south 
movement at different times through the use of alternating signal phases 
would have created some delay, the signal phasing could have been adjusted 
to allow the heavier flow a longer green light, and thereby expedite 
traffic flow at peak periods. A reduction in left turn collisions could 
also have been achieved through lengthening the left turn signal phase.
A study by Gurnett (45) showed that most drivers would have been willing
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to accept an extra delay to reduce the possibility of a collision and its 
associated expenses and possible injury.
Rear-end collisions here were related to two specific sets of 
conditions. Those on Northwest 23rd were the result of no signal 
synchronization, with the signal to the east only 150 yards away. This 
created a constant stop and go situation where rear-end collisions were 
inevitable.
An equal number of rear-end collisions occurred on Classen, which 
had a synchronized signal system. One explanation was that the synchro­
nization could have been out of phase, creating a hazardous situation.
Most likely, the problem was created by the large number of accesses to 
Classen between the signalized intersections. The advantage of platooning 
through signal synchronization is lost if large numbers of vehicles 
enter the roadway between intersections.
Considering the general confusion surrounding this location, those 
changes that would bring the greatest accident reduction per dollar spent 
were:
a) permitting north and southbound traffic on Classen to proceed at 
alternate times or increasing the length of the left turn signal 
phase,
b) synchronizing both the north-south and east-west traffic flow,
c) installing larger, more prominent, and more numerous signal faces, 
particularly for the left turning traffic on Classen and
d) using new lane markings with particular emphasis on making all 
the lane widths relatively equal.
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Northwest Expressway and May Avenue
This intersection (Figure 10) was unique in its construction and 
configuration. Unlike the other intersections, this one was a clover- 
leaf shaped rotary. Both May and the Northwest Expressway were four lane, 
divided roadways, each with an asphalt surface. May Avenue crossed over 
the Northwest Expressway by means of an overpass.
There were no traffic signals or other control devices, except 
for "yield" signs at the ends of each of the ramps. Painted lane markings 
were in fair to good condition on both roads; there were none on the ramps, 
The lanes on both roadways were at least 12 feet in width, and the ramps, 
which were only a single lane wide, were all at least 16 feet wide.
The surrounding area was primarily commercial, although, there 
were no establishments in a close proximity to the accident sites them­
selves. The roadways and ramps were both well lighted, and there were
no apparent visibility problems. Speed limits on the roads were 40 miles 
per hour on May Avenue, and 50 miles per hour on the Northwest Expressway. 
There were no speed limit signs on any of the ramps.
No traffic volume studies were available for this rotary, however, 
an approximation of travel on the two major roadways was arrived at 
through the use of vehicular flow data for adjoining intersections on 
both the major arteries. These figures gave an approximate vehicular
flow of 44,000 vehicles per day on the two major roads, but no estimates
were obtainable for the entrance and exit ramps.
The accidents at this location occurred earlier in the week than 
would have been expected, probably as a result of commuter traffic, and 
just under two-thirds of them took place between the hours of 11:00 in
103
May Avenue
2Z77z;w///7/7%{/y7//v;7/77;%7/
Northwest Expressway
Yield
Exit
75 Feet
Figure 10. Northwest Expressway and May Avenue
104
the morning and 5:00 in the afternoon. This was most likely related to 
the increased noon hour and afternoon rush hour traffic flow.
The most common type of collision at this site was the rear-end 
type, by an overwhelmingly large margin of 28 out of 30. As a result of 
this, there was only 1 injury and only $305 average property damage, the 
least of the 10 locations surveyed.
The primary environmental causative factor in all of these acci­
dents was the lack of entering or exiting lanes from either of the major 
roadways. Vehicles were impelled to leave a lane of high speed travel,
40 or 50 miles per hour, and immediately slow down to less than 25 miles 
per hour in order to negotiate the tightly curved ramps. This problem 
was reversed when leaving the ramp and entering the high speed traffic. 
With no entering or exiting lanes, smoothness of traffic flow could not 
be maintained, thus creating a very choppy, stop and go, traffic movement. 
The addition of these special turning lanes would be expensive in lieu 
of the minor property damage collisions which were occurring; however, 
the costs would be offset in only a few years, and traffic flow and acci­
dent occurrence would be greatly reduced.
There were two other environmental hazards, whose role in accident 
causation was not clearly identifiable, but which should still have been 
remedied. There were no signs on any of the exit ramps stating the safe 
speed. This was even more important in that the ramps were sharply curved, 
and would require slow speeds to be negotiated safely. The second problem 
also concerned signs. The ramps were not clearly marked resulting in 
drivers missing the ramp entirely or having to jam on their brakes in 
order to execute the turn. For those ramps that were marked, only three
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out of seven, the exit signs were located at the junction just beyond 
the exit instead of before it.
Recommendations for improvement of the driving environment at this 
location were:
a) the construction of entrance and exit lanes on all ramps,
b) the placement of speed limit signs on all ramps and
c) the relocation of existing exit signs and placement of new ones
at unmarked ramps to facilitate better traffic flow and provide
the driver with more information upon which to base his 
driving decisions.
West Expressway and North Meridian 
Both North Meridian and the West Expressway (Figure 11) were major 
access roadways. North Meridian consisted of fdur lanes plus one lane 
for left turns only. The West Expressway contained six lanes plus one 
specifically for left turns. It also had a wide grass median nearly 
50 feet across. Both roads were of asphalt and utilized both painted 
and thermoplastic lane markings. Generally, the thermoplastic strips 
remained more intact and visible than the painted markings.
The entire intersection was controlled by a traffic actuated 
signal system, giving more green time to the east-west flow and providing 
special phasing for left turns. Signal faces were both pole mounted 
and mast-arm mounted. All four directions were allowed to make a right 
turn on a red light after stopping. The speed limit on Meridian was 
40 miles per hour and on the West Expressway 50 miles per hour.
The roadside area was highly commercialized with gasoline stations 
on all four corners, each of which had driveways entering both of the
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major streets. Numerous painted and neon signs provided a poor background 
for driver visibility, and added one more problem to an already complicated 
intersection.
Due to the heavy flow of traffic, nearly 40,000 vehicles per day, 
the accident rate was relatively low, only 0.200 per 100,000 vehicles.
This heavy vehicular movement itself was an indirect factor in accident 
causation.
Collisions here were apportioned throughout the week with the 
majority occurring toward the latter part (Table 18). Their distribution
by the time of day (Table 19) was fairly even with one large peak in the
afternoon from 2:00 to 6:00.
Rear-end collisions were the most common type with about half as 
many left turn and right angle impacts. There were also four fixed object 
collisions.
The approach to decreasing the accident occurrence at this inter­
section was one of a systems approach, rather than an analysis of inde­
pendent factors. To arrive at the causes of these accidents, the entire 
intersection, as well as the roadside environment, had to be considered.
The left turn collisions all fell into the same category. Vehicles 
attempting to make a left turn after the green arrow had changed to yellow 
were struck by oncoming vehicles in the first lane of travel, beyond two 
lanes of visibility obstructing traffic. These collisions could have 
been virtually eliminated by allowing a 2- or 3-second red phase following
the green arrow to permit turning vehicles to complete their movement
safely before the oncoming traffic was allowed to proceed.
The other collisions were of many varied configurations, following
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no clearly definable pattern. The best explanation for these collisions 
was that they were simply a result of the overall confusion, heavy traffic 
volume and numerous distractions present at this location. Both roads 
were high speed arteries, yet this intersection required many complicated 
maneuvers including slowing down, turning and changing lanes.
A basic premise of traffic control is separation of vehicles and 
limitation of their movements as a means of improving traffic flow and 
decreasing collisions. This was a necessary remedial action at this 
intersection. A combination of changes including better roadway markings 
such as arrows to indicate proper movements and all red signal phases to 
limit access to the intersection to only one group of vehicles at a time 
were important remedial measures. Synchronization of adjoining inter­
sections would have been an improvement leading to a smoother traffic flow 
with no sudden stops or turning maneivers.
This intersection has all the necessary lanes and signals, but 
better utilization of them would have reduced accidents and eliminated 
much .of the confusion. Some of these recommendations were:
a) all red phases between each phase of the signals,
b) extensive, but clear, pavement markings to indicate movement 
of various lanes and provide better separation of traffic 
performing different maneuvers,
c) limiting of commercial advertising in the vicinity and placing 
of business accesses as far away from the intersection as 
possible and
d) synchronization of this intersection and other adjoining ones 
to increase smoothness of traffic flow.
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Southeast 59th Street and High Street 
Southeast 59th Street (Figure 12) was a four lane, two-way road, 
and High Street was a two lane, two-way road. Both roadways were surfaced 
with asphalt which was in fair condition on Southeast 59th Street and 
in very poor condition on High Street with many cracks and holes. In 
addition to being a side street. High Street, south of this intersection, 
served as an access road to an interstate highway. The intersection was 
further complicated by an exit ramp from the highway which emptied onto 
Southeast 59th Street in a westbound direction.
The roadside area was entirely commercial with two gasoline stations 
on the northwest and southwest corners of the intersection. There was 
a large amount of loose sand and gravel throughout the intersection which 
had a definite adverse effect on vehicle traction, particularly when 
braking. A large number of trucks used this intersection primarily for 
entering and exiting the highway, and many had some difficulty maneuvering 
through the small intersection, particularly in turning procedures.
The only method of traffic control at this intersection was the 
use of stop signs on High Street. Southeast 59th Street had no method 
of traffic control. The speed limit on Southeast 59th Street was 40 
miles per hour, and there were no speed limit signs within a mile of the 
intersection on High Street.
This intersection had the lowest traffic volume of the ten locations 
examined (Table 20) with nearly 90 per cent of the traffic entering the 
intersection on Southeast 59th Street. Because of this low volume, this 
location had the highest accident rate at 0.483 (Table 21). The collision 
pattern with regard to day of week was relatively normal compared with
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that of Oklahoma City as a whole. Large numbers of accidents occurred 
during both the morning and evening rush period.
Nearly half of the accidents at this site were right angle collisions, 
which was the expected pattern for non-signalized locations. For the 
same reason, rear-end collisions, which were more prevalent at signal­
ized intersections, were few in number. There were several lefV turn 
accidents, mostly involving vehicles turning south onto High Street to 
enter the highway.
The basic problem at this intersection was the necessity for the 
installation of a signal system. The system would be traffic actuated, 
so as f.o allow a green phase on High Street only when vehicles were 
approaching. There was enough room for expansion of Southeast 59th 
Street to include a left turn lane with s special left turn signal, which 
would also be utilized only when vehicles were waiting to make a left 
turn. The remainder of the time, the light would be continuously green 
for traffic on Southeast 59th Street.
The recommendations concerning this locale were logical ones;
a) the installation of a traffic signal system including left turn 
phasing to better structure traffic movement through this 
intersection,
b) the improvement of the performance of some highway maintenance, 
cleaning the roadway of loose sand and gravel and the repair of 
the road surface and
c) the construction of a left turn lane on Southeast 59th Street.
Reno and South Western 
This intersection actually included three streets (Figure 13). In
112
d
Reno
_LÜ
10 '
10 '
□
20 '
10 10 9' 12 '
Western
12'
81
14'
%
O  No Left Turn
I 1 Right Lane Must
  Turn Right
Traffic Signal 
I 1 = 10 Feet
10 '111 1011010
30'
Exchange
Figure 13. Reno and South Western
113
addition to Reno and South Western, Exchange Street entered the inter­
section from the southwest corner. This served to complicate the vehicle 
movements and increased the hazard of collisions.
All three roadways were asphalt and in relatively poor condition, 
and there were numerous ruts, cracks and holes. Some of the pavement 
markings were clear, but most were moderately faded. There were no 
painted arrows on the roadway. Lane widths were quite erratic, including 
many lanes of less than 10 feet in width which increased the opportunity 
for side swipe and lane changing collisions.
Traffic control signs north of the intersection on the southbound 
side of Western directed traffic in the right hand lane to make a right 
turn only. Vehicles approaching from the north, south and west were not 
permitted to make left turns during the morning and afternoon rush periods.
This entire intersection was controlled by traffic signals, all but 
one of which were pole mounted. North, south, east and westbound vehicles 
all received the same amount of green time, with the northeastbound traffic 
receiving slightly less time. The southbound traffic was allowed to make 
a right turn when the northeastbound traffic had the green light.
Th)e total daily traffic volume at this intersection was over 
33,000 vehicles, with an accident rate of 0.237 per 100,000 vehicles, 
which was seventh highest among the 10 locations included in this study.
The accidents at this intersection were related to commuter traffic, in 
that they occurred evenly throughout the Monday to Friday period (Table 
18). All but five of the accidents occurred between the noon hour and 
the end of the afternoon rush hour (Table 19). Only two people were 
injured in collisions here, and the average property damage was $450, the
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second lowest of those locations observed (Table 17). This indicated 
that the collisions were minor in nature, often the result of a confused 
driver making a wrong move in a crowded intersection.
Normally, at a signalized intersection, right angle collisions 
are rare. At Reno and Western, it was the most common type. There were 
equal numbers of rear-end and side swipe accidents and only three left 
turn collisions.
With no left turn lanes or arrows, a larger number of left turn 
collisions would have been expected. There were three alternative factors 
which limited this type of collision. The volume of traffic making a left 
turn was. only 6 per cent of the total volume handled by this intersection. 
Left turns were prohibited for eastbound, northbound and southbound 
traffic during rush hours. To a lesser extent, the vehicle speeds were 
moderately low here, and drivers were able to stop before striking a 
turning vehicle.
The rear-end collisions were distributed on all roadways leading 
to the intersection, indicating a simple lack of smooth flow. This 
intersection was not synchronized with any others, accounting for this 
situation.
The large number of right angle impacts indicated that the signal 
lights were not effectively stopping one lane of traffic before allowing 
another to proceed. Most likely, an all red phase would have reduced 
the number of these collisions markedly.
The last type of collision, side swipes, illustrated an interesting 
characteristic of intersections of the Reno and Western type. The 
reduction of conflicting movements is primarily a matter of reducing large
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open areas, such as this one. These open areas multiply the number of 
conflicts, create lane changing problems through the lack of channelization, 
they are difficult to signalize, and they are likely to create traffic 
jams (9).
Eastbound and westbound traffic were forced to change lanes as 
they traversed the intersection, due to the uneven alignment of Reno.
Traffic on Exchange Street found it necessary to make a left turn side 
by side through an unchannelized intersection into a large open space 
two lanes wide. These built-in hazards only increase the confusion and 
burden placed on the driver in making certain decisions while negotiating 
the intersection.
Recommendations for this intersection could have been generally 
characterized as simplifying operations. These were:
a) the resurfacing of the entire area and new, clearly discernable 
lane markings applied,
b) the alignment of the roads improved to eliminate side swipe 
collisions,
c) the use of an all red signal phase to restrict traffic movements
and limit right angle collisions,
d) the increasing of the number and size of signal faces, preferably
on mast-arms where they would be more visible and
e) the prohibition of all left turns or the installation of left 
turn lanes and signal phasing.
CHAPTER VI
sijmmary and conclusions
Traffic safety is one form of safety which is considered part of 
the field of public health. With over 50,000 fatalities and 2,000,000 
injuries annually it is among the most important public health problems. 
Neither traffic safety researchers nor public health specialists have 
yet advanced any effective solution to this problem.
Traffic safety researchers have, for the most part, assumed the 
theory of driver negligence and therefore, have devoted much of their 
efforts to the investigation of human variables and to a lesser extent, 
vehicle factors. Despite their efforts, the number of accidents and 
injuries have increased annually. Recently, some concern has been 
expressed over the role of the environment in automobile accident causation. 
This area of research is most important, since it is the one over which 
safety researchers have the most direct and immediate control.
The remodeling of antiquated and dangerous intersections has also 
been shown to be an effective measure in facilitating traffic flow. The 
frequency of collisions is directly related to traffic density itself.
In this research, the 10 highest accident density intersections 
in Oklahoma City for 1972 were studied in detail to relate environmental 
factors to accident occurrence. There were between 29 and 40 collisions
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at each location. Each of the intersections examined in this study was 
found to contain certain environmental features which contributed to 
accident causation. Elimination of these hazards would result in acci­
dent reduction.
Equally as important as remodeling dangerous intersections is the 
design of future intersections with safety features built in. Many of 
the environmental factors isolated through research should have been 
corrected in the planning stage before new intersections were constructed. 
This approach to accident reduction is of a preventive nature, and is 
compatible with the basic principles of public health.
Through this research, many measures have been discussed to reduce 
intersection accidents. As a result of this discussion the following 
conclusions and recommendations were made.
1. Nearly all of the ten intersections studied had one predominant 
type of collision which was more easily related to environmental 
factors rather than to driver negligence. At Northwest 36th and 
Meridian, where no left turn lanes or phases were in operation,
23 collisions of the left turn type occurred during the past year. 
The same problem exists at the Northwest Expressway and Portland 
intersection, and at the Southwest 74th and Pennsylvania location. 
Virtually all of the collisions at the Northwest Expressway and 
May Avenue rotary were of the rear-end type. This was due to the 
lack of special turning lanes and not to driver error. As a result 
of the overwhelming evidence contained in this research the obvious 
conclusion is that environmental factors do, in fact, play a 
major role in accident causation.
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2. These environmental hazards can be easily identified through 
investigation of high density accident locations. Common types 
of collisions can be related to individual environmental com­
ponents of the particular intersection. It is recommended that 
a program of continuous evaluation be established to identify 
hazards and to recommend modifications of these intersections.
This program would also include continuous incorporation of these 
revisions into design and planning for future intersection 
construction. Similar investigative programs should be established 
in other major cities to bring about a nationally significant 
reduction in automobile collisions. Several aspects of each 
intersection to be considered in this survey include:
a) organization of intersections into a system to promote 
better traffic flow,
b) placement and utilization of traffic control signs and signals,
c) special lanes for special purposes,
d) road surface, roadway markings and lane channelization,
e) signal phases, including left turn, all red and longer yellow 
phases and
f) removal of roadside hazards, including visibility obstructions 
and commercial advertising which interfere with signs or 
signals.
3. Environmental hazards, once identified, can be easily remedied, 
usually by minor design changes or addition of special turning 
lanes and signal phasing. These changes prove extremely worthwhile 
when evaluated by means of a cost benefit analysis. In most cases.
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environmental defects can be remedied for $10,000 or less and 
thus reduce the annual property damage through collisions by 
more than $20,000 annually. Even redesign projects costing 
$50,000 or more would be paid for in only 2 or 3 years through 
reduced accidents alone, without even considering the reduction 
in personal injury and medical expenses.
4. There is an obvious need for an improved accident report system 
to identify the real causative factors in accident occurrence 
whether human, vehicle or environmental in nature. The present 
system relatinf virtually all accidents to driver error is a 
hindrance to automobile accident reduction.
5. Research is still needed in this area and could be accomplished 
through in-depth investigation of hazardous intersections where 
large numbers of collisions occur. Some areas of further research 
include:
a) designing signal systems and traffic patterns for entire 
cities to evaluate the effect of improved traffic flow 
on accident reduction,
b) investigating the effect of roadside a,dvertisements, such as 
neon signs and billboards, on driver distraction and inat­
tention,
c) examining the skid résistent properties of intersection 
approaches and relating this information to rear-end collisions,
d) studying the relationship between the dawn and dusk periods 
and visibility problems as they relate to accident occurrence 
and
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e) evaluating the effect of mass transportation systems on both 
traffic flow and accident occurrence.
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APPENDIX A
OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE ACCIDENT REPORT
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Unit 
1 3 Oascribe
Unit 
1 2 Oescrrbe
1. Foiled to Yield 
3 Followed too Closely 
3. Unsoft Speed
8. Mode Improper Turn
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6. Slopped in Troffic Lame
7. Foiled to Slop 
I. Uniofe Vehicle
9. Left of Center
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APPENDIX B
TRAFFIC VOLUME DATA
TABLE 22 
TRAFFIC VOLUME DATA
Intersection 7:00 
8 AM
8:00 
9 AM
9:00 
10 AM
10:00 
11 AM
2:00 
3 PM
3:00 
4 PM
4:00 
5 PM
5:00 
6 PM
Total
Main & Western 2,303 2,068 1,909 1,926 2,299 2,234 3,044 2,374 18,187
NÎ7 Exp. & Portland 2,512 2,335 1,651 1,680 2,036 2,624 3,042 3,000 18,880
SW 74 & Penn. (N) 1,266 934 1,006 1,170 1,346 1,422 1,666 2,010 10,821
(S) 1,404 994 1,020 1,135 1,398 1,387 1,699 2,062 11,099
NW 39 & May (N) 1,809 1,921 1,697 1,764 2,163 2,267 2,578 2,665 16,864
(S) 1,717 1,820 1,536 1,769 2,218 2,312 2,344 2,707 16,423
NW 36 & Meridian 2,410 1,933 1,562 1,381 1,847 2,327 2,767 2,664 16,891
NW 23 & Classen 3,344 3,121 2,638 2,670 3,197 3,134 4,085 3,944 26,133
W Exp & Meridian 3,241 2,352 1,985 1,871 2,734 3,069 3,575 3,869 22,696
SE 59 & High 1,409 1,024 813 735 986 1,312 1,646 1,479 9,444
Reno & Western 2,616 2,179 1,995 1,874 2,262 2,440 3,081 2,629 19,076
w
lO
NW Exp. & May was not included since no traffic volume study was made at that location.
